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Harris v. State10/11/2001
, and they had not previously seen the cap. Harris testified on cross-examination that he was a methamphetamine user and that he had used the drug only a few days before his arrest. We find that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Harris guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of methamphetamine.
3. Harris claims that the prosecution improperly put his character into evidence. We agree. Harris made a motion in limine before trial to exclude testimony that on the day of the arrest he was en route home from Chattanooga, Tennessee, where he had appeared in court in response to a robbery charge. The trial court correctly granted Harris's motion, noting that the Tennessee court appearance was not relevant. Nevertheless, the prosecutor asked Harris's wife, who had been with him in the car, and who had testified on direct examination that they had been to court earlier and were on their way back home, to repeat her testimony that she had been in court with her husband, and then asked her:
Q: And what had ya'll been to court for that day.
A: It was aggravated robbery.
Defense counsel objected. At a bench conference, the trial court told the prosecutor that his line of questioning was improper. The trial court then gave the jury a limiting instruction on similar transaction evidence, which included an instruction that, "The law provides that evidence of other offenses committed by this Defendant which are similar or connected to the offense for which the Defendant is on trial, may be admissible."
This sequence of events was fatally prejudicial to Harris's defense. First, the testimony solicited by the prosecution regarding Harris's court appearance in Chattanooga on a robbery charge was irrelevant and reflected badly on his character. "It is error in a criminal case for the State to place the defendant's character into issue when he has not voluntarily chosen to do so." Secondly, if the prosecution solicits excluded prejudicial testimony, the trial court is, upon objection and if it chooses not to declare a mistrial, required to direct the jury to disregard such testimony. Here, upon objection by defense counsel to the prosecution's questioning, the trial court did not instruct the jury to ignore the prejudicial testimony, but instead immediately instructed the jury on similar transaction evidence although no similar transaction evidence had been introduced. This instruction infers that the jury had heard evidence that Harris had committed another offense when no such evidence was introduced. Finally, the evidence supporting Harris's guilt is not overwhelming, and we have found that upon the prosecution's intentional introduction of irrelevant and inadmissible evidence, "we will not speculate to the prejudice of the defendant by concluding the error must have been harmless." Harris's conviction must be reversed.
4. Finally, Harris argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. In view of division three of this opinion, the claim is moot.
Judgment reversed.
Blackburn, C. J., and Pope, P. J., concur.
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