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Taylor v. State10/1/2001
fact that Taylor's mother voluntarily turned over the gun when asked about it after Taylor's confession. Since Taylor's mother did not testify, it is unclear what was said to her at that time or what motivated her to turn over the gun. Without more information, her cooperation under different circumstances cannot be accurately predicted. The trial court's findings show an absence of demonstrated historical facts that the police were moving inevitably to the discovery of the gun absent Taylor's statement.
The police also did not possess other lawful means of uncovering the gun prior to Taylor's statement. Without more than the fingerprint match on the cup, there was no probable cause to obtain a search warrant of the mother's trailer where Taylor did not live. The trial court erred by finding that the gun would have been inevitably discovered.
4. The State argues an alternative reason for the admission of the .38 revolver if Taylor's statement is suppressed. In Wilson v. Zant, this Court held that the "fruit" of a voluntary statement obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona is not subject to the exclusionary rule. The Wilson holding was supported by a later United States Supreme Court decision, Oregon v. Elstad, which held that the "fruit" of a voluntary Miranda-tainted statement need not be suppressed. The rationale for not suppressing the fruits of a voluntary statement taken in violation of Miranda and Edwards is that these cases announced prophylactic rules designed to protect suspects' Fifth Amendment rights, but the rules were not themselves constitutional. Referring in Elstad to the admissibility of the fruit of a Miranda-tainted statement, the Supreme Court stated, "If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself." The police in this case failed to honor Taylor's request for counsel, but they did not violate her Fifth Amendment right against coerced self-incrimination. Therefore, because the gun was the fruit of a voluntary statement, we conclude that it is admissible at Taylor's trial.
We reject Taylor's argument that the recent United States Supreme Court case of Dickerson v. United States requires a different result. Taylor argues that Dickerson undermined the rationale in Wilson and Elstad because the Supreme Court held in Dickerson that "Miranda announced a constitutional rule" and a constitutional violation in the taking of her statement would mandate the suppression of the gun. The Supreme Court, however, discussed Elstad in the Dickerson opinion by stating, "Our decision in [Elstad] - refusing to apply the traditional `fruits' doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases --does not prove that Miranda is a non-constitutional decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment." Therefore, we conclude that the Supreme Court intends to preserve a distinction in the law permitting the fruits of voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda to be admissible.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who concurs in Divisions 1, 2, 4 and in judgment.
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