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People v. Hinojos-Mendoza7/28/2005
d consider the statutory scheme as a whole to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. Mishkin v. Young, 107 P.3d 393 (Colo. 2005). We also presume the General Assembly intends a just and reasonable result when it enacts a statute, and a construction that leads to an absurd result will not be followed. Section 2-4-201(1)(c), C.R.S. 2004; Conte v. Meyer, 882 P.2d 962 (Colo. 1994).
Section 18-18-405(3)(a)(III) then stated:
ny person convicted pursuant to [§ 18-18-405(2)(a)] for knowingly . . . possessing with intent to . . . distribute . . . an amount that is . . .
(III) One thousand grams or one kilogram or more of any . . . schedule I or schedule II controlled substance . . . shall be sentenced to the department of corrections for a term greater than the maximum presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum presumptive range provided for such offense in section 18-1-105(1)(a) . . . . (Emphasis added). Section 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(A) provided that a class three felony carries a presumptive range of four to twelve years.
However, another subsection of § 18-1-105 provided that " nlawful distribution, manufacturing, dispensing, sale, or possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell, distribute, manufacture, or dispense, as defined in section 18-18-405" is an extraordinary risk of harm crime, and the "maximum sentence in the presumptive range shall be increased by four years." Section 18-1-105(9.7)(a), (b)(XI); People v. Coleman, 55 P.3d 817 (Colo. App. 2002).
We perceive no conflict between these statutory provisions. In § 18-18-405 the General Assembly defined the elements of the crime of possession with intent to distribute and incorporated the presumptive range statute found in former § 18-1-105(1)(a). Section 18-18-405 does not preclude the finding that an offense is an extraordinary risk crime and application of former § 18-1-105(9.7) to increase the presumptive range found in subsection (1)(a).
We also reject defendant's interpretation of § 18-18- 405(3)(a)(III) because it leads to an unreasonable result. The statute provides enhanced sentencing for possession with intent to distribute. That offense is also always an extraordinary risk crime. Defendant's argument that his sentence should be limited to the presumptive range in former § 18-1-105(1)(a) would nullify the General Assembly's intent to enhance the sentence for possession because it is "an extraordinary risk" crime under former § 18-1-105(9.7).
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err by sentencing defendant to sixteen years in the DOC.
The judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
JUDGE ROTHENBERG and JUDGE VOGT concur.
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