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People v. Malin8/5/2005
g interpretations. Paciga v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 322 Ill. App. 3d 157, 161 (2001). Our supreme court further instructs courts that, " f the language of a statute is susceptible to two constructions, one of which will carry out its purpose and another which will defeat it, the statute will receive the former construction." Harvel v. City of Johnston City, 146 Ill. 2d 277, 284 (1992). A court should not construe a statute in a manner that would lead to consequences that are absurd, inconvenient, or unjust. People v. Rodriguez, 339 Ill. App. 3d 677, 681 (2003). Further, a court should avoid an interpretation of a statute that would render any portion of it meaningless or void. Paciga, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 161.
Applying these principles to the instant case, we believe that because the truth-in-sentencing provisions apply to section 9--3(e) of the Code, the provisions also apply to subsection 9--3(e--5) of the Code. Section 9--3(e) criminalizes conduct involving the reckless homicide of one person. 720 ILCS 5/9--3(e) (West 2002). Section 9--3(e--5) criminalizes conduct involving the reckless homicide of two or more persons. 720 ILCS 5/9--3(e-5) (West 2002). To accept the defendant's argument that the truth-in-sentencing provisions do not apply to section 9--3(e--5) would mean that the Illinois General Assembly intended that a defendant who killed more than one person in a reckless homicide should be subject to more lenient early release provisions than a defendant who killed just one person. This is an absurd construction of the statute and we will not interpret it as such. See Rodriguez, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 681.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County.
Affirmed.
McLAREN and KAPALA, JJ., concur.
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