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People v. Kleutgen8/1/2005
off duty and outside his jurisdiction." It further ruled that Bergeron's arrest of defendant was not a valid arrest by a private person under section 107--3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/107--3 (West 2002)).
The State moved to reconsider, contending that the court had erred in ruling that improper lane use was not an "offense other than an ordinance violation" under section 107--3. The State argued that improper lane use is a petty offense, for which a private person may make an arrest, and that, further, if the private person is an out-of-jurisdiction peace officer, his or her use of the powers of office to make the arrest does not invalidate it.
The court denied the motion to reconsider, ruling that, assuming arguendo that "Bergeron was not acting as a police officer, improper traffic lane usage is not a crime." The State, having filed a certificate of impairment, now appeals.
The State asserts (among many other things) that defendant's arrest was proper as an arrest by a private person under section 107--3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that " ny person may arrest another when he has reasonable grounds to believe that an offense other than an ordinance violation is being committed." 725 ILCS 5/107--3 (West 2002). We agree. The parties do not dispute that Bergeron saw defendant's car veering in and out of its lane before he arrested her. This gave Bergeron probable cause to believe that the driver was committing improper lane use, an offense under the Vehicle Code. See People v. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d 289, 297 (1996) (an officer's seeing the defendant's vehicle cross a lane marking gave him probable cause for an arrest for improper lane use). Further, Bergeron's use of his emergency lights did nothing to invalidate the arrest.
Generally, we will not reverse a trial court's ruling on a petition for rescission unless the ruling was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d at 295. However, when the facts are undisputed, the matter becomes one of law, and our review is de novo. See Village of Mundelein v. Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d 842, 848 (2003). Further, we review a trial court's determination of the facts underlying its ruling on a motion to quash arrest under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, but review de novo its determination of whether, under those facts, the arrest was proper. See People v. Ortiz, 355 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1064 (2005). Thus, when the facts are not in dispute, our review is simply de novo. Here, our analysis is based on the essential, undisputed facts that Bergeron was out of his jurisdiction, saw defendant's car weaving, and arrested her using his car's police radio and emergency lights. Our review is therefore de novo.
Defendant asserts that certain facts--that her driver's license was suspended at the time of her arrest, that Bergeron was on duty at that time, and that he was in contact with a Kendall County peace officer before making the arrest--are in dispute and that, therefore, the judgment should be subject to manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review. However, these purportedly disputed facts play no part in our analysis. Thus, we conduct de novo review based on the undisputed facts.
We turn now to the core point, that Bergeron properly arrested defendant pursuant to section 107--3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: " ny person may arrest another when he has reasonable grounds to believe that an offense other than an ordinance violation is being committed." 725 ILCS 5/107--3 (West 2002). The arguments raised by the parties require us to consider three points: (1) whether an out-of-jurisdiction peace officer is among those who may make an arrest under t
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