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State v. Rheaume4/9/2004
nably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Although the focus of the inquiry is on the perception of the suspect, the police cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words and actions. Thus, an incriminating statement made in the course of casual conversation is not the product of interrogation.
165 Vt. at 345, 683 A.2d at 13 (internal citations omitted).
27. A blanket rule prohibiting all questioning is overbroad and unworkable. We have already rejected it in FitzGerald. We believe that the objective standards developed in Innis and Muniz define a line sufficiently bright for predictable application.
28. We also conclude that the policy interests weigh heavily against defendant's position where the questions go to the identity of the person the police have arrested. As we said above, establishing the identity of the arrested person is a central concern of the booking function. Indeed, the failure to provide satisfactory proof of identity may provide grounds for arrest. See V.R.Cr.P. 3(c)(1). It may determine the ability to gain pretrial release. If a *1269 suspect refuses to identify him or herself, it is likely that the police can determine identity by nontestimonial methods.
29. We view questions related to defendant's identity for booking as being closer to requests for consent to search we allowed despite Miranda objections in State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 392, 750 A.2d 1002, 1008-09 (2000), than to custodial interrogation. In Crannell, a state trooper asked to search defendant's pick-up truck after he had received Miranda warnings and then invoked his right to silence and requested an attorney. Defendant argued that the "request for consent to search violated his rights because: (1) it was interrogation, and (2) it elicited testimonial information that he owned the truck." 170 Vt. at 391, 750 A.2d at 1008. Finding neither of defendant's arguments persuasive, we held that the request was not interrogation because "a defendants's consent to search is not an incriminating response" and that acknowledging ownership of the truck did not elicit testimonial information because the testimonial component was de minimis and it was a "foregone conclusion" that defendant owned the truck. Id. at 393-94, 750 A.2d at 1009. As in Crannell, the answers to the questions relating to identity may have adverse consequences for the defendant, but the answers themselves are not incriminating responses, or the testimonial component is minor and a "foregone conclusion." Id.
30. For the above reasons, we conclude that none of the analysis considerations outlined in Jewett lead us to the conclusion that we should reject Muniz under Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution and hold that Miranda was violated when the police requested and obtained from defendant identifying information during booking, despite the fact that defendant had invoked his right to remain silent. Affirmed.
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