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State v. Rheaume4/9/2004
mination, we conclude that neither would support defendant's position here.
23. The first case, State v. Ketchum, was decided under Article I, Section 10 of the Hawaii Constitution, the self-incrimination provision. The court decided that it would not adopt a routine booking question exception to Miranda, as described in Muniz. Ketchum, 34 P.3d at 1018-19. Instead, it announced the following rule:
[W]e reaffirm the principle that "interrogation" consists of any express question--or, absent an express question, any words or conduct--that the officer knows or reasonably should know is likely to elicit an incriminating response.... The totality of the circumstances must be considered to determine whether "interrogation" has occurred, with a focus upon the officer's conduct, the nature of the question (including whether the question is a "routine booking question"), and any other relevant circumstance.
34 P.3d at 1020 (internal citations omitted). We find the rule in Ketchum largely indistinguishable from that announced in the decisions properly interpreting Muniz. For example, in Hughes, after adopting *1268 the routine booking question exception, the court stated that "[t]he routine booking question exception ... does not encompass questions that are designed to elicit incriminating admissions." 695 A.2d at 142. The court went on to explain that determining whether a question is designed to elicit an incriminating response requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, including the context in which the question was asked. We question whether any case decided in Hawaii would reach a result different from that in Maryland as a result of the Hawaii Supreme Court's statement of its rule. Cf. Note, Recognizing and Limiting the Routine Booking Question Exception, 57 Md. L.Rev. 753, 771 (1998) (interpretation of Muniz in Hughes "takes away most of the bite of the exemption"). More importantly, we see no reason why the application of the Hawaii rule would change the result in this case.
24. The second decision, Allred, is even less supportive of defendant's position here. Although the decision suggests some disagreement with Muniz under the self-incrimination provision of the Florida Constitution, that disagreement did not extend to Muniz's holding on the routine booking question exception. In fact, the court explicitly adopted the exception: "We find however [sic] that routine booking questions do not require Miranda warnings because they are not designed to lead to an incriminating response; rather, they are designed to lead to essential biographical data." 622 So.2d at 987. The result in this case would be no different if Allred were the controlling precedent.
25. Finally, defendant contends that for public policy reasons we should not recognize an exception to Miranda for questions concerning identity that are asked only for administrative purposes. Defendant argues that such an exception "may provide an incentive for police to attempt to circumvent Miranda." We are not convinced.
26. In the leading case of Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), the Supreme Court explained that Miranda' s core concern was with protecting the suspect's privilege against self-incrimination in custodial interrogation. Thus, the Court was concerned with "words or actions ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Id. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682; see State v. FitzGerald, 165 Vt. 343, 345, 683 A.2d 10, 13 (1996). We noted in FitzGerald:
The safeguards of Miranda attach whenever a person in custody is subjected to interrogation. Under Miranda, the term "interrogation" encompasses only "words or actions ... that the police should know are reaso
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