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Waldrip v. Commonwealth7/8/2005
se plate be conspicuously displayed on the front and rear of every motor vehicle. Lacasella had placed a license plate in the front window of his car, but the officer mistakenly interpreted Montana's statute as requiring the plate to be displayed on the front bumper. After investigating, the officer arrested Lacasella for driving under the influence of intoxicants. On appeal from an adverse lower court decision, the Montana Supreme Court held that an officer's mistake of law could not justify an investigatory stop.
Based on Kaufman and Lacasella, Waldrip argues the stop of his automobile violated the Fourth Amendment because Trooper Boyd's mistake regarding the license plate did not constitute a reasonable and articulable suspicion justifying the stop. Even if the stop was justified, Waldrip contends, once the trooper realized his mistake, he was required to return to his vehicle and leave without confronting the driver.
When reviewing suppression issues, we first evaluate the trial court's findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. If so, the factual findings are conclusive. Next, we review de novo the court's application of the law to the facts to determine whether its legal conclusions are correct.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Thus, Trooper Boyd's testimony constitutes substantial evidence which supports the lower court's findings of fact.
As to the law, Waldrip urges us to adopt the holdings found in Kaufman and Lacasella. However, these cases are distinguishable from the present case. In Lacasella, the police officer made a mistake of law. In this case, Trooper Boyd made a mistake of fact, not of law. Consequently, Lacasella does not apply.
In Kaufman, after the officer recognized his mistake, he explained to Kaufman why he initiated the stop, but, after offering the explanation, he continued to detain and interrogate Kaufman without any suspicion that the driver or his passenger were engaged in criminal activity. In this case, as in Kaufman, Trooper Boyd realized his mistake and approached Waldrip to apologize for stopping him. But, unlike Kaufman, Trooper Boyd continued to detain Waldrip only because he detected the odor of alcohol emanating from his vehicle. Once Trooper Boyd smelled alcohol, he had a reasonable and articulable suspicion, separate and distinct from his prior mistake regarding the license plate, which justified -- and in fact required -- continuation of the stop. So Kaufman is factually distinguishable and does not apply.
We disagree with the contention that once Trooper Boyd realized his mistake, he had no choice but to leave without confronting Waldrip. Instead, we agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Court that " s a matter of courtesy, officer could explain to drivers in [Waldrip's] circumstances the reason for the initial detention and then allow them to continue on their way without asking them to produce their driver's license and registration." Although Trooper Boyd realized his mistake before speaking to Waldrip, he was not prohibited from speaking to him in order to explain why he initiated the stop.
Calloway District Court correctly denied Waldrip's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop.
And Calloway Circuit Court appropriately upheld the district court's decision. Consequently, the circuit court's order is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
Page 1 2 Kentucky DUI Attorneys
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