State v. Adam11/26/2001
ancial motive and bias in testifying against Adam.
In considering this motion, the court questioned whether Wentworth knew that Adam's conviction could be used as evidence in his civil lawsuit against Adam. The court was advised that "those applications are automatically given to victims or alleged victims" and that Wentworth was functionally illiterate. In denying the motion, the court applied HRE § 403 (1993) and stated:
So where are we going? I'm trying to keep the issue on track, rather than waste everybody's time, going out and bringing the Criminal Injuries Compensation [Commission], or the victim[']s counselor coming in to testify as to what the prosecutor's procedure is when there is a complainant, that the victim[']s counselor would go and talk to these alleged victims to have them fill out these applications.
However, prior to considering the motion, the court stated that " t the outset, the Court would note that any of the Court's rulings on these motion in limine may be reconsidered, should counsel believe that there is other evidence that the Court should consider, other circumstances."
As a witness for the State, Wentworth testified that he was not able to read. Although " he credibility of a prosecuting witness in a criminal case is always relevant, and cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination[,]" State v. Liuafi, 1 Haw. App. 625, 630, 623 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1981) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)), Wentworth was not cross-examined regarding his possible interest in a civil lawsuit. Adam's right to introduce page three of the application depended on Wentworth's answer to one or more relevant questions which Wentworth was never asked. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's ruling.
D. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for a New Trial
On March 14, 2000, Adam filed a motion for a new trial, and on March 16, 2000, he filed a motion for judgment of acquittal. In these motions, Adam stated the court should reconsider four points: (1) the collateral estoppel issue raised in his Motion in Limine III; (2) the issue raised in his Motion in Limine II; (3) the issue raised in his Motion in Limine I; and (4) the sufficiency of the evidence. Stating it would not revisit these issues, the court denied the motion as to points (1), (2), and (3). Stating "that a reasonable jury could conclude the defendant guilty based on the evidence presented in court[,]" the court denied the motion as to point (4).
"The standard to be applied by the trial court in ruling upon a motion for a judgment of acquittal is whether, upon the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and in full recognition of the province of the trier of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. An appellate court employs the same standard of review." State v. Pone, 78 Hawaii 262, 265, 892 P.2d 455, 458 (1995) (internal brackets omitted). The test on appeal is not whether guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether substantial evidence existed to support the jury's decision. State v. Jackson, 81 Hawaii 39, 46, 912 P.2d 71, 78 (1996). "'Substantial evidence' as to every material element of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a [person] of reasonable caution to support a conclusion." State v. Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 248-49, 831 P.2d 924, 931, reconsideration denied, 73 Haw. 635, 834 P.2d 1315 (1992) (citations omitted). Under such a review, we give "
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