State v. Garrison9/8/2005
int set up to look for evidence of drunk driving or any other crime, as in Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed. 2d 333 (2000). In discussing Edmond, the Supreme Court in Lidster stated:
Neither do we believe, Edmond aside, that the Fourth Amendment would have us apply an Edmond-type rule of automatic unconstitutionality to brief, information-seeking highway stops of the kind now before us. For one thing, the fact that such stops normally lack individualized suspicion cannot by itself determine the constitutional outcome. As in Edmond, the stop here at issue involves a motorist. The Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist's car as his castle. See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-113, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed. 2d 81 (1986); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed. 2d 116 (1976). And special law enforcement concerns will sometimes justify highway stops without individualized suspicion. See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (sobriety checkpoint); Martinez-Fuerte, supra (Border Patrol checkpoint). Moreover, unlike Edmond, the context here (seeking information from the public) is one in which, by definition, the concept of individualized suspicion has little role to play. Like certain other forms of police activity, say, crowd control or public safety, an information-seeking stop is not the kind of event that involves suspicion, or lack of suspicion, of the relevant individual.
For another thing, information-seeking highway stops are less likely to provoke anxiety or to prove intrusive. The stops are likely brief. The police are not likely to ask questions designed to elicit self-incriminating information. And citizens will often react positively when police simply ask for their help as "responsible citizen " to "give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966). Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424, 124 S.Ct. at 889.
In considering the reasonableness of the stop at issue in this case, we note again that this was not a checkpoint stop. Rather, at 11:00 o'clock at night, the officer heard a disturbance of public concern. The officer observed one vehicle leaving the area and stopped that vehicle to ask the occupant and driver what he may have seen or heard. The officer had no intent to arrest or even ticket defendant. There was a public concern, and the intrusion was minimal. There was no discriminatory action.
Conclusion
The conviction and sentence are affirmed.
STEWART, J., dissenting
The majority goes through great lengths to reach a conclusion that is clearly at odds with the facts and evidence presented by the instant case. Therefore, I am compelled to respectfully dissent. I fail to understand how the majority finds Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed. 2d 333 (2000) applicable to this case. Edmond involved a class action by motorists who alleged that drug interdiction checkpoints violated their Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Edmond court held that the checkpoints were illegal because their purpose was indistinguishable from a general interest in crime control and thus were distinct from other court upheld checkpoints such as those whose goal was to discourage illegal aliens (see U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed. 2d 1116) or removing drunk drivers from the road (Michigan Dept. Of State Police v. Stitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed. 2d 412). This matter does not involve checkpoints by highway patrolman or city po
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