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Baker v. State4/15/2005
ly or concurrently to the Kenai sentence, the sentences are concurrent as a matter of law. Baker relies on Griffith v. State.
In its brief, the State does not appear to challenge Baker's legal conclusions. Rather, the State asserts that Judge Motyka's sentencing remarks establish "a clear intent to impose the more severe sentence reflected in the written judgment." The State argues that Judge Motyka emphasized that Baker's Anchorage offenses were distinct from the Kenai offenses and that the Anchorage case had to be viewed "on its own merits." The State points out that Judge Motyka rejected Baker's suggestion that the Kenai sentence was a sufficient punishment for both cases. The State also points out that Judge Motyka specifically referred to the fact that Baker committed the Anchorage offenses while he was out on bail on the Kenai case and concluded that Baker was undeterable.
Until 1982, AS 12.55.025(e) provided that if "the [sentencing] court does not specify, the [defendant's] sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. But in 1982, the legislature amended AS 12.55.025(e). We interpreted this amended statute to express a legislative preference for consecutive sentences. (AS 12.55.025(e) was repealed by the legislature in 2004. But AS 12.55.025(e) was in effect when Baker committed his crime and was sentenced. We therefore decide the case under the statute which was in effect at that time.)
In Griffith v. State, we construed the 1982 version of AS 12.55.025(e). In Griffith, the State pointed out that the former statute created a presumption in favor of concurrent sentences, and that this presumption no longer existed under the 1982 revision.
But we concluded that despite the altered presumption, "in those situations where the sentencing judge has discretion to impose concurrent sentences he should make findings to justify the imposition of a consecutive sentence."
It appears that Griffith is the only published case where we have addressed the findings which a court had to make in order to impose consecutive sentences under the 1982 version of AS 12.55.025(e) . And in Griffith, we stated that the trial judge had to make findings which justified the consecutive sentence. Therefore the Griffith decision retained the rule that a sentencing judge must specify that a sentence is consecutive in order to impose a sentence consecutively.
In this appeal, as we have pointed out, the State has not argued for a different rule. Rather, the State has argued that Judge Motyka's sentencing remarks clearly establish his intent to impose his sentence consecutively to the Kenai sentence. But we see Judge Motyka's sentencing remarks as, at best, ambiguous. Judge Motyka certainly stated that he saw Baker's Anchorage offense as distinct from the Kenai offense and rejected Baker's suggestions that the Kenai sentence was sufficient punishment for both cases. But Judge Motyka imposed a sentence of 111/2 years of imprisonment. This was a sentence substantially greater than the Kenai sentence (which at that time was 6 years of imprisonment).
Had Judge Motyka imposed a sentence of 5 or 6 years of imprisonment, the State would have a stronger argument that his sentencing remarks demonstrated his intent to impose the Anchorage sentence consecutively to the Kenai sentence. Judge Motyka clearly set out his intent to punish Baker separately for the Anchorage case. But Judge Motyka imposed a sentence of 111/2 years of imprisonment for the Anchorage case - a sentence which, even when imposed concurrently, represented substantial additional punishment for the Anchorage case. Judge Motyka's sentencing remarks are, therefore, consistent with imposing a con
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