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Byrd v. Stavely5/5/2005
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Davidson, C.J., and Ney, J., concur
Two county court judges, John F. Stavely and Thomas Reed (collectively county courts), appeal the district court's order granting the C.R.C.P. 106 motions of defendants, Alicia Byrd and Robert Claudell, to have their criminal cases tried by a jury without being required to follow statutory procedures that apply to petty offenses. We affirm.
The principal issue in this appeal is whether a defendant charged with driving while ability impaired (DWAI), a misdemeanor, must comply with the requirements of § 16-10-109(2), C.R.S. 2004, to have his or her case tried by a jury. This inquiry requires a determination of whether a first-time DWAI charge is classified as a petty offense or a serious offense for purposes of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. To make this determination, we interpret § 42-4-1301, C.R.S. 2004, which defines various offenses for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
The district court determined that DWAI is a serious offense for Sixth Amendment purposes. We conclude that DWAI is a petty offense under the Sixth Amendment, but, nevertheless, under the statutory scheme, first-time DWAI defendants need not comply with the requirements of § 16-10-109(2).
I. Background
In separate incidents in 2002, Byrd and Claudell were charged with DWAI. Both defendants appeared at their arraignments pro se and pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, the county court held a case management conference and set Byrd's case for a jury trial. Approximately ten days later, she retained counsel. A motions hearing was held, and the county court reset her jury trial date.
Claudell retained counsel before his case management conference, and the county court set his case for a jury trial.
The People moved to vacate both jury trials based on Byrd's and Claudell's failure to comply with § 16-10-109(2), which requires a defendant charged with a petty offense who wants a jury trial to make a written request and pay a twenty-five dollar fee within ten days of arraignment.
The county courts in both cases granted the People's motions based upon their determination that the offense charged was a "petty offense" under § 16-10-109(1), C.R.S. 2004, and therefore, Byrd and Claudell were not entitled to jury trials because they failed to comply with the requirements of § 16-10-109(2).
Byrd and Claudell petitioned the district court for review pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), which provides relief, inter alia, when a county court has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. After filing his C.R.C.P. 106 motion, Claudell moved to join his case with Byrd's, and the district court granted the motion.
The district court determined that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed Byrd and Claudell jury trials because the offense they were charged with was a "serious offense," not a "petty offense," under § 16-10-109(1). The district court concluded that the county courts' rulings were erroneous and remanded the cases for jury trials unless defendants formally waived their right to a jury trial.
Although Claudell is still a party to this appeal, Byrd was the only party to file an answer brief. Accordingly, we will refer only to her arguments.
II. C.R.C.P. 106
The county courts contend that the district court erred in ruling that C.R.C.P. 106 motions were the appropriate form of relief for Byrd and Claudell. We disagree.
C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)(I) directs the reviewing court to determine whether a lower tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its dis
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