 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Garcia v. State4/21/2005
issue, the Second District certified conflict with Goodman, which holds that when a defendant denies knowledge of the presence of an illegal substance, he or she automatically places into dispute any knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance.
Law and Analysis
In 1973, this Court established a presumption of the scienter element of drug charges arising from actual possession. See State v. Medlin, 273 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1973). In Medlin, the defendant gave a capsule to another person, and it contained an illegal substance. Despite the fact that Medlin told the other person that the capsule would make her "go up," Medlin argued that there was no proof at trial to show that he delivered the capsule with knowledge that it contained a barbiturate. Medlin was convicted of delivery of an unlawful barbiturate. The district court reversed the conviction finding that there was no proof adduced to show that Medlin delivered the capsule with knowledge that it contained a barbiturate or barbiturate derivative. On review, this Court quashed the district court's decision and held that the State was not required to prove knowledge or intent since both were presumed from the doing of the prohibited act. The standard jury instructions for the crime of possession--the relevant crime in this case--were then adopted. In the instruction, knowledge of the presence of the substance was listed as an element, and the Medlin presumption was incorporated into that instruction by the following language: "If a person has exclusive possession of a thing, knowledge of its presence may be inferred or assumed." However, the instruction did not list knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance as an element. An accompanying note to the instruction stated that " f the defense seeks to show a lack of knowledge as to the nature of a particular drug, an additional instruction may be required." Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) Drug Abuse (1981).
In 1987, this Court addressed whether the jury instructions on trafficking offenses were erroneous because they did not include knowledge of the nature of the substance as an element. See State v. Dominguez, 509 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1987). The Court found, under the relevant statutes at the time, that mens rea was an element of all trafficking charges. The Court then expressly amended the jury instructions on trafficking offenses to include a fourth element: that the defendant "knew the substance was (specific substance alleged)." Id. at 918.
In 1996, the Court applied the rationale of Dominguez to possession offenses. See Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996). In Chicone, the defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine. The trial court refused Chicone's request to instruct the jury that the State had to prove he knew the substance he possessed was cocaine. On review, this Court held that guilty knowledge is part of the statutory offense charged. Id. at 738. The Court rejected the argument that Medlin stood for the proposition that guilty knowledge is not an element of possession and held that the relevant statutes expressly required that the defendant knowingly possess a controlled substance. In Chicone, the State was required to prove the defendant knew of the illicit nature of the items in his or her possession, and the existing jury instructions had to adequately state the "knowledge of the presence of the substance" element Id. at 745 (emphasis added). However, the trial court was only required to "expressly indicate to jurors that guilty knowledge means the defendant must have knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance allegedly possessed" if "specifically requested by a defendant." Id. at 745-46.
Chicone did not address whether a
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Florida DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|