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Garcia v. State4/21/2005 417 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), which acknowledged that the relevant statutes did not expressly require "knowing" possession of a controlled substance but concluded that the State must still prove general intent. The Court also reviewed and rejected a principle of statutory construction that the Legislature need not require proof of intent in codifying crimes mala prohibita. The Court then concluded that the relevant statutes "are more akin to offenses that presume a scienter requirement" because of the substantial criminal penalties imposed, Chicone, 684 So. 2d at 742-43, and held:
We believe it was the intent of the legislature to prohibit the knowing possession of illicit items and to prevent persons from doing so by attaching a substantial criminal penalty to such conduct. Thus, we hold that the State was required to prove that Chicone knew of the illicit nature of the items in his possession.
Id. at 744. The Court further wrote, "While the existing jury instructions are adequate in requiring 'knowledge of the presence of the substance,' we agree that, if specially requested by a defendant, the trial court should expressly indicate to jurors that guilty knowledge means the defendant must have knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance allegedly possessed." Id. at 745-46 (emphasis added). In conclusion, the Court held that the trial court erred in denying Chicone's request and, without engaging in harmless error analysis, remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
In a final footnote to Chicone, the Court suggested its holding was an appropriate subject to be addressed by the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases. Id. at 746 n.14. Later, in In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (97-1), 697 So. 2d 84, 85-87 (Fla. 1997), the Court adopted amendments proposed by that committee which inserted a fourth element of knowledge of the nature of the substance into the jury instructions on trafficking offenses and added the following language to the definition of "possession" within those instructions:
Give if applicable. See Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996).
If a thing is in a place over which the person does not have control, in order to establish constructive possession the State must prove the person's (1) control over the thing, (2) knowledge that the thing was within the person's presence, and (3) knowledge of the illicit nature of the thing.
Id. at 87. However, despite that Chicone specifically addressed a challenge to the jury instructions on a possession charge, the same amendments were not made to the standard jury instructions for possession offenses.
After Chicone, confusion remained regarding the standard jury instructions for possession offenses, and the issue returned to this Court three years later in Scott v. State, 808 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 2002). In Scott, the defendant was convicted of possession of contraband in a correctional facility. At trial, Scott's theory of defense had been that he did not possess the contraband and had no knowledge of its presence in his locker where it was found. He requested an instruction pursuant to Chicone that the guilty knowledge element includes knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance. The trial court denied the request. On appeal, Scott argued that because the burden was on the State to prove he knew the substance was cannabis even if he had not raised the issue at trial, the trial court erred in failing to give the instruction. The district court disagreed. See Scott v. State, 722 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), quashed, 808 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 2002). But on review, this Court agreed with Scott and
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