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Moody v. State6/15/2005
riety tests.
As a general rule, Miranda warnings are not required while an investigating officer conducts preliminary questioning or field sobriety tests; however, after a DUI suspect is under arrest, Miranda warnings must precede further field sobriety tests in order for evidence of the results to be admissible.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Polizzotto v. State, 248 Ga. App. 814, 816 (1) (547 SE2d 390) (2001). In this case, there was no evidence that the officer made "any statement that would cause a reasonable person to believe that he was under arrest and not temporarily detained during an investigation. . . ." Id. at 817 (1). As a result, the trial court properly denied this ground of Moody's motion to suppress.
2. In his remaining enumeration of error, Moody claims the trial court erred because it admitted evidence of three previous DUI convictions that were not similar or relevant and found that the probative value of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial impact. We find no merit in these arguments because the State met its burden of demonstrating the three prerequisites to admission of similar transaction evidence: (1) a permissible purpose for admitting the evidence; (2) sufficient evidence that the defendant committed the prior act; and (3) sufficient similarity between the previous act and the one with which the defendant is charged. Lowenthal v. State, 265 Ga. App. 266, 268 (1) (593 SE2d 726) (2004).
It is well settled that previous DUI convictions are admissible as similar transaction evidence and relevant to show bent of mind and course of conduct. See, e.g., Noble v. State, 275 Ga. 635, 636 (2) (570 SE2d 296) (2002); Kirkland v. State, 206 Ga. App. 27, 28 (3) (424 SE2d 638) (1992). The State also established sufficient similarity: in each of the previous cases, Moody was arrested for DUI while driving late at night and in each of the cases he consented to a breath test that showed he was well over the legal limit, as he was in the present case. While one of the previous convictions occurred almost fifteen years earlier, it was the most similar, as Moody's intoxication in that case was also discovered after he was stopped for speeding. The lapse of time was not sufficient to render this previous DUI inadmissible; instead, it went to the weight of the evidence. See Scott v. State, 240 Ga. App. 586, 588 (2) (524 SE2d 287) (1999); Hill v. State, 230 Ga. App. 89, 90 (495 SE2d 333) (1998).
Finally, we find no merit in Moody's claim that the trial court should have exercised its discretion to find that the prejudicial impact of the similar transaction evidence outweighed its probative value. See Smith v. State, 232 Ga. App. 290, 292 (1) (501 SE2d 523) (1998) (recognizing trial court's discretion and finding it did not clearly err). "The decision to admit prior similar transaction evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Enloe v. State, 239 Ga. App. 513, 514 (2) (520 SE2d 925) (1999). As in Lucas v. State, 234 Ga. App. 534, 537 (2) (507 SE2d 253) (1998), we find no abuse of discretion because, in light of the trial court's limiting instruction to the jury, the similar transaction evidence was not unduly prejudicial.
Judgment affirmed. Ruffin, C. J., and Johnson, P. J., concur.
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