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Delta Airlines6/16/2005
Jack Townsend was injured when his vehicle was struck head-on by a car operated by William Serio. At the time of the collision, Serio was driving home from the Atlanta airport, where he had arrived on a Delta Airlines (Delta) flight from Milwaukee. Alleging that Serio became intoxicated by the consumption of wine served to him while on that flight, Townsend filed a tort action against him and Delta in the Superior Court of Fulton County. The claim against Delta was based upon the Georgia Dram Shop Act (GDSA), OCGA § 51-1-40, and common law negligence.
Asserting federal preemption, Delta removed the case to federal court. The district court concluded that there was no federal claim and no federal preemption of any state cause of action, and remanded the case to the superior court. After remand, Delta moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The trial court granted Delta's motion, holding that the air carrier was not subject to state tort liability for supplying alcohol to a passenger on an interstate flight. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of Townsend's common law negligence claim, but reversed as to the claim based upon the GDSA. The Court of Appeals held that, " urely, the Georgia legislature intended our dram shop statute to apply in these circumstances. [Cits.]" Townsend v. Delta Airlines, 269 Ga. App. 645, 648 (1) (605 SE2d 54) (2004). Delta applied for certiorari, which we granted to review the holding of the Court of Appeals that Townsend stated a viable claim for recovery under the GDSA.
1. "At common law there was no right of recovery for selling or furnishing intoxicating liquor to an intoxicated person. [Cit.]" Henry Grady Hotel Co. v. Sturgis, 70 Ga. App. 379, 385-386 (1) (28 SE2d 329) (1943). "'"The common-law rule holds the man who drank the liquor liable and considers the act of selling it as too remote to be a proximate cause of an injury caused by the negligent act of the purchaser of the drink."'" Keaton v. Kroger Co., 143 Ga. App. 23, 26 (327 SE2d 443) (1977).
Thus, so long as the common-law rule is adhered to, it matters not whether the act of furnishing liquor may be considered as simple negligence or as negligence per se in violation of the criminal statute -- it cannot, alone, leap the common law's chasm of causation. [Cits.] This is why the violation of liquor laws cannot be analogized to other types of negligence per se, and why legislation is required which directly imposes liability in derogation of the common law."
Keaton v. Kroger Co., supra at 27.
When the General Assembly enacted the GDSA "in 1988, it abrogated the common law rule ..., and created a new cause of action." Riley v. H & H Operations, 263 Ga. 652, 654 (2) (436 SE2d 659) (1993). Because the statute is in derogation of common law, it is Townsend's "exclusive remedy [for seeking to impose liability on Delta] for damages arising from [Serio's] driving while intoxicated." Hulsey v. Northside Equities, 249 Ga. App. 474, 478 (3) (548 SE2d 41) (2001). Not only is the GDSA the sole legal remedy available to Townsend, it has always been a rule of construction of statutes that those in derogation of the common law, that is those which give rights not had under the common law, ... must be limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed, and not extended beyond the plain and explicit terms of the statute. The legislature is presumed to act with knowledge of this rule of construction, and with that body only lies the right and privilege to grant rights not given under the common law and to extend and broaden any rights so granted. Such is not the function of the courts.
Thompson v. Watson, 186 Ga. 396, 405-406 (197 SE2d
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