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State v. Elledge10/3/2001
REVERSED, RENDERED, AND REMANDED.
The defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated, fourth offense. He filed a motion to quash alleging that one or more of his prior convictions for driving while intoxicated was invalid and, therefore, could not be used in support of the charged offense. The trial court granted the motion. The State appeals. For the following reasons, we reverse.
Factual and Procedural Background
On November 6, 2000, the State filed a bill of information charging the defendant, Michael T. Elledge, with driving while intoxicated, fourth offense, a violation of La.R.S. 14:98(E). The bill contains the allegation that the defendant entered pleas of guilty to charges of driving while intoxicated on May 29, 1997, January 13, 1999, and June 26, 2000.
On December 22, 2000, the defendant filed a motion to quash, alleging that "one or more of the predicate offenses" could not be used for enhancement purposes in the instant charge. In addition to claims related to his right to counsel, the defendant asserted that he "was not properly advised of rights pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 556.1 and jurisprudence interpreting the Federal and State Constitutions."
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to quash with regard to the conviction of June 26, 2000, concluding that the court accepting the plea failed to apprise the defendant of the mandatory minimum and maximum sentences possible for the charge, a violation of La.Code Crim.P. art. 556.1.
The State appeals, assigning the following as error:
The trial court erred by granting the defendant's Motion to Quash in the instant prosecution, thereby precluding the State from using a plea to a prior driving while intoxicated charge to enhance the penalties imposed on a subsequent offense in contradiction to the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Guzman, 99-1753 (La. 5/16/00); 769 So.2d 1158.
The defendant contends that the plea, entered without counsel present at the hearing, could not have been voluntary without information regarding the minimum/maximum penalty range available for the offense.
Discussion
With regard to the burden required of a defendant challenging the State's use of a prior conviction as a predicate offense, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Carlos, 98-1366, 6-8 (La. 7/7/99); 738 So.2d 556, 559-60, explained:
In [State v. Shelton, 621 So.2d 769 (La.1993)], this Court recognized that Boykin does not require that the entire burden be placed on the prosecution in a recidivism proceeding . . . . Rather, the presumption of regularity that attaches to prior convictions encouraged us to revisit our previous system of placing the entire burden on the State to prove the validity of prior convictions. Id. Consequently, we held that when a defendant denies the allegations contained in the bill of information in an habitual offender proceeding, the burden is on the State to prove the existence of the prior guilty pleas and that the defendant was represented by counsel when they were taken. Id. If the State meets this initial burden, the defendant must produce affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea. Id. If the defendant carries this burden, then the burden reverts to the State to prove the constitutionality of the plea. Id. The State will meet this burden by producing a "perfect" transcript of the guilty plea colloquy. Anything less than a "perfect" transcript, such as a guilty plea form or minute entry, will require the trial judge to weigh the evidence submitted by both sides and determine whether the
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