 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Drogan v. State4/6/2005
ive a car while under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it makes it "less safe" for the person to drive, while OCGA § 40-6-391 (b) makes it illegal for a person to drive a car while under the influence of a prescribed drug if the person is "rendered incapable of driving safely" as a result of the drug. This issue has previously been addressed by Georgia courts. The court in State v. Kachwalla, [supra], held that the two are "equivalent standards" and therefore one charged with DUI under the "less safe" standard, as opposed to the "rendered incapable of driving safely" standard, has not suffered unconstitutional disparate treatment. Thus, the trial court did not violate the Equal Protection Clause when it gave the "less safe" jury charge nor was it compelled to give the "rendered incapable of driving safely" jury charge when it was requested by [Drogan]. See Jones v. State, 168 Ga. App. 106 (1) (308 SE2d 209) (1983).
(Emphasis supplied.) Johnson v. State, 268 Ga. App. 426, 428 (2) (602 SE2d 177) (2004).
Further, the charge as given was not an improper comment upon the evidence by the trial court. See Harris v. State, 118 Ga. App. 848 (166 SE2d 94) (1968); Huff v. State, 113 Ga. App. 257 (147 SE2d 840) (1966).
4. Drogan's third enumeration is that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of arresting officer Anderson.
During his cross-examination of the officer, Drogan began questioning him about other DUI arrests he had made of other defendants and whether certain manifestations, such as glassy or bloodshot eyes, were present in a large percentage of them. The State's objection was sustained and defense counsel indicated he wanted to go into the officer's experience and training. The trial court specifically stated that counsel could go into the officer's experience and training, but "how as to other people perform doesn't have anything to do with the way your client performed." After discussing the issue further, defense counsel stated, "I'll move on to his training, Your Honor, and just his training alone."
"A party cannot ignore what he thinks to be error, take his chance on a favorable verdict, and complain on appeal." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) West v. State, 224 Ga. App. 190, 191 (2) (480 SE2d 238) (1997). See also Boatright v. State, 192 Ga. App. 112, 116 (5) (385 SE2d 298) (1989).
Even considering the merits of the claim, however, we find no abuse of discretion. Although a defendant is entitled to a thorough and sifting cross-examination of the State's witnesses, OCGA § 24-9-64,
ithin carefully protected legal parameters, the scope of cross-examination lies within the sound discretion of the trial court; this discretion will not be disturbed by an appellate court absent manifest abuse. Basically, the confrontation clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way and to whatever extent[ ] the defense might wish.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Battaglia, 221 Ga. App. 283, 284-285 (1) (470 SE2d 755) (1996).
Judgment affirmed. Phipps and Mikell, JJ., concur.
Page 1 2 3 4 Georgia DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|