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Jones v. State5/6/2005
Following a jury trial, Robert K. Jones appeals his conviction for DUI and other traffic offenses, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and arguing that giving a jury charge from the Implied Consent statute was improper. We hold that, beyond the evidence of Jones's smelling of alcohol and of his bloodshot, glazed-over eyes, the evidence of Jones's erratic driving and of his refusal to undergo field sobriety or chemical tests sustains his DUI conviction. We have previously upheld the challenged jury charge. Accordingly, we affirm.
Construed in favor of the verdict, the evidence shows that several witnesses observed Jones's erratic driving of his car, including his rear-ending a stopped vehicle while traveling 35 mph and then attempting in a bizarre fashion to escape in his damaged car. Police arrived before Jones went far and pulled him over. Police found Jones smelling strongly of alcohol and in a dazed state with glassy, bloodshot eyes and with a half-empty bottle of vodka on the floorboard. Lethargic and unsteady, Jones declined police requests to undergo field sobriety tests. After being arrested and receiving an Implied Consent warning, he also refused to submit to chemical tests.
Charged with DUI (less safe), leaving the scene of an accident, failing to have proof of insurance, and following too closely, Jones was tried by a jury, which found him guilty on all counts. He appeals.
1. Regarding Jones's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, and Jones no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. Short v. State. We do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, but only determine if the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Jones guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia.
Jones was convicted of driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive. On appeal, Jones does not dispute that he smelled of alcohol or that his eyes were bloodshot, dazed, and glassy; rather, citing Clay v. State, he argues that such alone is insufficient to sustain the conviction, as it does not show impairment. Jones ignores, however, that the record is replete with other evidence of his impaired state.
"Methods of proof [to show impairment] may include evidence of (i) erratic driving behavior, (ii) refusal to take field sobriety tests and the breath or blood test, and (iii) the officer's own observations (such as smelling alcohol and observing strange behavior) and resulting opinion that the alcohol made it less safe for the defendant to drive." Drogan v. State. Here the State used all three methods.
(a) Manner of Driving
"When there is evidence that the defendant has been drinking, the manner of his driving may be considered on the question of whether he has been affected by alcohol to the extent that he is less safe to drive." Pecina v. State. For example, traffic violations may "suggest the negative influence of intoxication on the operation of the vehicle." In the Interest of C. P. M. See Drogan, supra at 2 (running red light and failing to yield right of way); Kelly v. State (speeding through stop sign). Rear-ending a clearly-visible vehicle may similarly demonstrate intoxicated impairment. See Shoemake v. State; Belyeu v. State. Other erratic or bizarre driving behavior may also show an impaired state. Long v. State (inextricably flashing high-beam lights at officer); Johnson v. State (coming up fast behind other cars and abruptly passing them).
Here, the evidence showed that Jones pulled out of a parking lot into t
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