People v. Bowman4/20/2005
, as she said, she didn't sign anything." The evidence clearly establishes that the State believed that Canady-Young did not provide a signed statement based on the absence of a grand jury transcript, notes of the conversation and the handwritten statement itself. The State cannot be charged with the obligation to correct the false testimony of a witness when it does not know that the witness' testimony is false. Defendant's claim is without merit.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing the maximum extended-term sentence. As previously stated, defendant was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment for reckless homicide and 12 years' imprisonment for aggravated driving under the influence , to run concurrently.
"It has long been established that the trial court has broad discretionary powers in choosing the appropriate sentence a defendant should receive." People v. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d 367, 373, 659 N.E.2d 1303, 1309 (1995). A reasoned judgment as to the proper sentence to be imposed must be based upon the particular circumstances of each individual case and depends upon many factors, including the defendant's credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits and age. People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154, 368 N.E.2d 882, 883 (1977). The imposition of a sentence is a matter within the trial court's discretion, and a reviewing court has the power to disturb the sentence only if the trial court abused its discretion. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d at 373-74, 659 N.E.2d at 1308.
"In determining an appropriate sentence, the defendant's history, character, rehabilitative potential, the seriousness of the offense, the need to protect society and the need for deterrence and punishment must be equally weighed." People v. Jones, 295 Ill. App. 3d 444, 455, 692 N.E.2d 762, 770 (1998). There is a strong presumption that the trial court based its sentencing determination on proper legal reasoning, and the court is presumed to have considered any evidence in mitigation that is before it. People v. Partin, 156 Ill. App. 3d 365, 373, 509 N.E.2d 662, 666-67 (1987). However, the trial court need not give "greater weight to the possibility of rehabilitation than to the seriousness of the offense." Partin, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 373, 509 N.E.2d at 666.
Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide, a Class 3 felony with a sentencing range of no less than 2 years and no more than 5 years (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a)(d)(2) (West 2002); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(6) (West 2002)), and aggravated driving under the influence , a Class 4 felony with a sentencing range of no less than 1 year and no more than 3 years (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2),(d)(1)(A) (West 2002); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(7) (West 2002)). The jury found that the State proved specialized aggravating factors with respect to each offense, namely, that Alexander was under the age of 12 and Rosario was 60 years old. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2 (b)(4)(i), and (b)(4) (ii) (West 2002). As a result of the jury's finding, the trial court sentenced defendant to the maximum extended sentence for each offense: 14 years for reckless homicide and 12 years for aggravated driving under the influence.
In imposing sentence in this case, the court considered the presentence investigation report and numerous letters from defendant's family, friends and co-workers testifying to his good character, his benevolence, and rehabilitative potential. The court also heard argument from defense counsel. The court then considered each factor as enumerated by statute (see 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1, 5/5-5-3.2 (West 2002)) and discussed the factors in mitigation and aggravation, the crimes committed, and the harm inflicted. The trial court properly considere
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