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People v. Cosenza5/19/2005
Docket No. 98074-Agenda 8-January 2005.
In this case, the Secretary of State, pursuant to section 11-505.1 of the Vehicle Code, summarily suspended defendant's driving privileges after defendant, who had been arrested for driving under the influence , was deemed by the arresting officer to have refused the officer's request to perform a Breathalyzer test. Defendant thereafter filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension in the circuit court of Kankakee County. The circuit court denied the petition. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the denial, holding that defendant's hearing was not completed within the time period set by statute. 346 Ill. App. 3d 211. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now reverse the judgment of the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
Defendant, Paul Cosenza, was arrested for driving under the influence on October 19, 2002. At the police station following his arrest, defendant attempted to take a Breathalyzer test. The test equipment failed to register a result, however, because defendant's breath sample was inadequate. When defendant did not attempt to give another sample, the officer administering the test deemed that defendant had refused the test. As a result, the Secretary of State later notified defendant that his driver's license would be summarily suspended. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2002).
On November 14, 2002, defendant filed a petition in the circuit court of Kankakee County to rescind the summary suspension. In the petition, defendant alleged that he suffers from chronic restrictive airflow disease and that his failure to provide a sufficient breath for the Breathalyzer was the result of that medical condition. In light of his condition, defendant maintained that his insufficient breath attempts should not have been deemed by the officer as a refusal of the test. The circuit court scheduled the hearing on defendant's petition on December 2, 2002. On that date, the hearing began, but was not completed. The matter was continued to December 17, 2002, in order to accommodate the scheduling conflicts that existed among defendant's counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial judge.
At the beginning of the reconvened hearing on December 17, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the hearing on his petition was not concluded within the 30-day period required under section 2-118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2002)). The circuit court denied defendant's summary judgment motion and ultimately denied defendant's petition to rescind the summary suspension. After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration from the circuit court, defendant appealed.
The appellate court reversed, holding that section 2-118.1(b) mandated that the hearing be completed within 30 days. 346 Ill. App. 3d 211. The appellate court rejected the State's primary contention, which was that the 30-day time period for the summary suspension hearing is analogous to the time period for the speedy-trial statute. As such, the State contended that a petitioner who does not object to a continuance beyond the 30-day period may be charged with delay. The appellate court did not accept this argument because it knew of no authority for the proposition that the rules in criminal proceedings, such as the speedy-trial statute, are applicable in civil proceedings. 346 Ill. App. 3d at 213. The court also rejected the State's claim that, because the original hearing commenced in a timely manner, the statutory requirements were met. The court held that under the plain language of section 2-118.1(b), the hearing is to be "conducted" within the 30-day period. 346 Ill. App. 3d at
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