 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Brown v. Commonwealth6/16/2005
deemed justifiable by any valid purpose that the actor's conduct serves. Since risk, however, is a matter of degree and the motives for risk creation may be infinite in variation, some formula is needed to identify the case where [wantonness] should be assimilated to [intention]. The conception that the draft employs is that of extreme indifference to the value of human life. The significance of [intention] is that. .. it demonstrates precisely such indifference. Whether [wantonness] is so extreme that it demonstrates similar indifference is not a question that, in our view, can be further clarified; it must be left directly to the trier of facts."
KRS 507.020 (1974 cmt.) (quoting Model Penal Code § 201.2 cmt. 2 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959)) (emphasis added). See also Nichols v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Ky. 1983).
We have held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of this mental state, sometimes referred to as "aggravated wantonness," Graves v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 858, 863 (Ky. 2000), in a number of cases involving unintentional vehicular homicides. In Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 539 (Ky. 1977), we held that the evidence was sufficient where the defendant, while under the influence of alcohol, drove his vehicle at a rate exceeding the speed limit and entered an intersection against a red light. Id. at 543. In Walden v. Commonwealth, 805 S.W.2d 102 (Ky. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805, 811 (Ky. 1996), we upheld a wanton murder conviction where the defendant lost control of his vehicle and crossed the center line while operating his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and at a high rate of speed. Id. at 105. In Estep v. Commonwealth, 957 S.W.2d 191 (Ky. 1997), we held that the evidence was sufficient where the defendant operated a motor vehicle at a high rate of speed after ingesting five different prescription drugs, one of which had debilitating effects of which she was aware, crossed the center line to pass another automobile in a no-passing zone, failed to return her vehicle to the proper lane, and caused a fatal collision. Id. at 193. In Love v. Commonwealth, 55 S.W.3d 816 (Ky. 2001), we held the evidence sufficient where the defendant was speeding, was intoxicated, and did not slow down or attempt to stop upon seeing a police car blocking the road but attempted to swerve around the police car while traveling a reported seventy to ninety miles per hour. Id. at 827. In Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351 (Ky. 2004), we held the evidence sufficient where the defendant was intoxicated, admitted he was aware of the risk of driving while intoxicated, and lost control of his vehicle while operating it at a high rate of speed because he wanted to show his passenger "what his car had." Id. at 362-63.
While the defendant in each of the preceding cases was impaired by an intoxicating substance, intoxication is not a prerequisite to a finding of extreme indifference to human life in a vehicular homicide case. The Commentary to KRS 507.020 is instructive as to what type of conduct might constitute aggravated wantonness: "Typical of conduct contemplated for inclusion in 'wanton' murder is: shooting into a crowd, an occupied building or an occupied automobile; placing a time bomb in a public place; or derailing a speeding locomotive." KRS 507.020 (1974 cmt.). Each of these examples involves an activity that poses a high risk to human life, undertaken in or directed toward a place where human beings are present; yet none of them requires intoxication. In other words:
Setting this conduct apart from behavior that would not warrant an unintentional murder conviction are the following characte
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Kentucky DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|