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Dunn v. Bar Association4/21/2005
s which the operation of the other subsections work. For instance, under Dunn's argument, a lawyer suspended for 240 days cannot apply for reinstatement at day 150 and expect SCR 3.510(2) to apply. SCR 3.510(2) applies to suspensions prevailing less than 180 days but the lawyer has a 240-day suspension. The application date is therefore irrelevant to the length of suspension unless it is late.
Under SCR 3.510, the date of the application for reinstatement only becomes a factor when the application is delayed longer than the suspension. Late or delayed applications cut the other way because they lengthen the suspension. If a lawyer suspended for three years is delinquent in the requirements of SCR 3.510(1) and does not meet those requirements until six years later, the delay will change the rules applicable to the reinstatement. SCR 3.510(3) would normally apply to the reinstatement of a lawyer suspended for three years. However, if by delay in paying the bonds or costs of original proceedings, the lawyer's suspension has persisted longer than 5 years, SCR 3.510(4) will control.
Because his suspension was to run concurrently with his criminal probation, the earliest time he could apply for reinstatement under the current SCR 3.510(5) would be anytime during the last ninety days. The end of Dunn's suspension was stated in Dunn II to be the end of his criminal probation, which was February 2005. Under SCR 3.510(5), the earliest time for applying to be reinstated is November 2004. Even if the application date were relevant, this length of time is longer than five years. Under this scenario, Dunn's suspension would persist longer than five years ; thereby, SCR 3.510(4) would apply.
Dunn did not have a fixed term-of-days suspension, but rather one fixed on the end of criminal probation. His probation had a fixed end date, February 2005, but the wording of our suspension in Dunn If allowed the suspension to end earlier if the criminal probation was ended. Therefore, applying the rule to the expected date would show that the suspension was originally to persist longer than five years, August 1999 to February 2005. On September 13, 2003, the Hopkins Circuit Court terminated his criminal probation. Dunn sought reinstatement and on May 12, 2004, the Character and Fitness Committee recommended resumption of the practice of law. Finally, on September 7, 2004, the KBA Board of Governors adopted the recommendation and approved Dunn's application for reinstatement. On October 16, 2004, Dunn was advised by letter that he must take and pass a written examination, as required by SCR 3.510(4), prior to having the application submitted to this Court.
Dunn's suspension has prevailed for longer than five years. Accordingly, SCR 3.510(4) applies to this reinstatement procedure.
The motion is DENIED. The reinstatement application is governed by SCR 3.510(4) which requires the successful completion of a written examination prior to the submission of the application to this Court.
All concur.
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