 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Magee5/6/2005
ssignment of error, the defendant avers the "trial judge erred in failing to remove juror Lenora Magee from the jury after she advised the court that she was the next-door neighbor of Ms. Carolyn Taylor, a pivotal prosecution witness, and had outside knowledge regarding the charged offenses that was not developed at trial."
Disclosure during the trial that a juror knows or is related to a witness or the victim is not sufficient to disqualify a juror unless it is shown that the relationship is sufficient to preclude the juror from arriving at a fair verdict. State v. Wilson, 2001-0625, p. 10 (La.App. 3rd Cir.12/28/01), 806 So.2d 854, 862, writ denied, 2002-0323 (La.9/13/02), 827 So.2d 1121; see also La.C.Cr.P. art. 797. The connection must be such that one must reasonably conclude that it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict. A trial judge is granted great discretion in determining whether to seat or reject a juror for cause, and such rulings will not be disturbed without a showing of an abuse of that discretion. State v. Wilson, 2001-0625 at p. 10, 806 So.2d at 862.
Following opening statements and prior to the State calling its first witness, juror Lenora Magee informed the trial judge that Carolyn Taylor. a State witness, was her next-door neighbor. The trial judge had counsel and Mrs. Magee approach the bench, and an extensive sidebar conference and examination on the subject ensued.
The information elicited from Mrs. Magee reveals that while she and Carolyn Taylor were next-door-neighbors, they were not friends. Also, while Mrs. Magee was told by Carolyn Taylor that "some foster kids" were "sexually abused" by their "mother's boyfriend", Mrs. Magee did not know the names of the children, the mother, or the boyfriend. It seems clear from this exchange that, aside from the scant information relayed to Mrs. Magee by Carolyn Taylor, Mrs. Magee never spoke with anyone else about the alleged incident of abuse so as to confirm or repudiate its veracity.
In State v. McIntyre, 381 So.2d 408, 409-10 (La.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871, 101 S.Ct. 209, 66 L.Ed.2d 90 (1980), the defendant had been indicted for aggravated rape and convicted. On appeal, the conviction was reversed, and the defendant was retried. At the second trial, the defendant challenged three prospective jurors because of their prior knowledge of the offense and of the defendant's previous conviction. Mrs. Kimball and Mr. Tyler had read newspaper accounts of the alleged previous crime. Mr. Tyler knew the defendant had been found guilty in the first trial. He discussed it with acquaintances and had the impression the defendant had raped the victim. Mr. Mason stated that a co-worker was on the jury in the first trial and that his co-worker thought the defendant had been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The jurors gave testimony that tended to rebut any inference of bias. Mrs. Kimball stated she had not formed an opinion as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. Mr. Mason stated that the statements of his fellow employee would not influence his decision in this case. Mr. Tyler stated he would put aside any prior knowledge or discussions he had about the case in making his decision and indicated he would presume the defendant innocent and would not vote to convict unless the State had proven him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's challenges for cause against these jurors.
Similarly, in the instant case, Mrs. Magee stated that she thought she could be fair and impartial in this case. She also explained that knowing Carolyn Taylor would not affect her opinion as to the defendant's g
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Louisiana DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|