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State v. Magee5/6/2005
ory intent. Such facts include, but are not limited to, a pattern of strikes by a prosecutor against members of a suspect class, statements or actions of the prosecutor during voir dire that support an inference that the exercise of peremptory strikes was motivated by impermissible considerations, the composition of the venire and of the jury finally empanelled, and any other disparate impact upon the suspect class which is alleged to be the victim of purposeful discrimination.
No formula exists for determining whether the defense has established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. A trial judge may take into account not only whether a pattern of strikes against African-American venire-persons has emerged during voir dire but also whether the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. State v. Rodriguez, 2001-2182, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/21/02), 822 So.2d 121, 128, writ denied, 2002-2049 (La.2/14/03), 836 So.2d 131.
Second, if the requisite showing has been made by the defendant, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. The second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. At that step, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral. Mitchell, 99-0283 at p. 7, 808 So.2d at 669-670. This is a burden of production, not one of persuasion. State v. Harris, 2001-0408, p. 4 (La.6/21/02), 820 So.2d 471, 473.
Faced with a race-neutral explanation, the defendant then must prove to the trial court purposeful discrimination. The proper inquiry in this final stage of the Batson analysis is whether the defendant's proof, when weighed against the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral reasons, is sufficient to persuade the trial court that such discriminatory intent is present. Thus, the focus of the Batson inquiry is upon the intent of the prosecutor at the time he exercised his peremptory strikes. Tilley, 99-0569 at p. 5, 767 So.2d at 12. The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the defendant. State v. Young, 551 So.2d 695, 698 (La.App. 1st Cir.1989).
The trial court should examine all of the available evidence in an effort to discern patterns of strikes and other statements or actions by the prosecutor during voir dire that support or reject a finding of discriminatory intent. Because the factual determination pertaining to intentional discrimination rests largely on credibility evaluations, the trial court's findings are entitled to great deference by the reviewing court. Tilley, 99-0569 at p. 5, 767 So.2d at 12-13.
In the instant case, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to excuse Climel Young and Carrie Henry, two African-Americans from the first panel of prospective jurors. Defense counsel objected to the challenges. The trial court found no improper pattern in the use of the challenges and overruled the objections. The prosecutor then used peremptory challenges to excuse Kylandis Jackson and Karen Cotton (as alternate), two African-Americans, from the second panel of prospective jurors. While the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to excuse four prospective African-American jurors, only Climel Young and Kylandis Jackson are at issue under this assignment of error.
When the prosecutor challenged Kylandis Jackson, defense counsel requested a racially neutral reason for the excusal. At this point, the trial judge stated, "I am going to--I would out of an
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