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State v. Magee5/6/2005
abundance of caution ask the State to give its reasons as to Ms. Jackson and Mr. Young and Ms. Henry."
The prosecutor responded:
Okay. With regards to Ms. Jackson ... I asked did anybody else have a problem concentrating on the case, Ms. Jackson talked about being in school. She said she had just started Delta College in Covington.... I asked her did she think that would cause her not to be able to concentrate. She said yes, it would cause a problem to (sic) her. I questioned her a good while about having people take notes for her and things of that sort, but she continued to affirm that she would have a hard time concentrating on the case because she would be thinking about that.
...
Mr. Young testified that he knew the defendant. That he thought he went to school with him, but he wasn't sure. Then he said he didn't know him although he went to school with him. I really had a question as to whether Mr. Young was being honest with me. You can't go to Varnado High School and somebody is your age, if you go there you know them because of the small size of the school.
...
Carrie Henry ... She was the one who had been on a jury who had acquitted.
After the prosecutor's explanations, the trial court ruled there was no Batson violation shown, and allowed the use of the peremptory challenge by the State.
The defendant contends that the trial court's "demand" that the prosecutor give reasons for excusing these jurors is "tantamount to a finding that the defense has presented enough evidence to meet the initial burden in step one, or that a prima facie case of discrimination has been made." The State, on the other hand, characterizes the trial court's request as "a tentative statement at best," and does not indicate that the trial court found such a prima facie showing.
Whether or not the defendant made a prima facie showing is immaterial since the prosecutor offered race-neutral explanations and the trial judge found no Batson violation. Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot. Rodriguez, 01-2182 at p. 8, 822 So.2d at 129.
We find that with respect to step two of the Batson analysis, the State's reasons for exercising peremptory challenges against Climel Young and Kylandis Jackson were facially race-neutral. They contained none of the cultural, geographic, or linguistic classifications which, due to the ease with which such classifications may serve as a proxy for an impermissible classification, invite particularly exacting scrutiny. Accordingly, the State sustained its burden of articulating race-neutral reasons for its exercise of the peremptory challenges at issue. See Rodriguez, 2001-2182 at p. 9, 822 So.2d at 129.
Whether these reasons were substantial and whether they are substantiated by the record is determined in step three of the Batson analysis. See State v. Burns, 98-0602, p. 21 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/19/99), 734 So.2d 693, 705, writ denied, 99-0829 (La.9/24/99), 747 So.2d 1114. After a careful review of the entire record of voir dire, we find no abuse of discretion or error by the trial court in accepting the State's reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge against prospective jurors Climel Young and Kylandis Jackson as race-neutral. The reasons offered in support of the State's challenges against Climel Young and Kylandis Jackson were race-neutral and supported by the record. Further, the challenges against those potential jurors were not pa
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