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State v. Chase12/12/2001
Reporter of Decisions
Argued: October 9, 2001
The State appeals from the order of the Superior Court (Waldo County, Marsano, J.) granting Keith Chase's motion to suppress the results of his blood-alcohol test. The State contends that the court erred in excluding an otherwise reliable blood-alcohol test on the basis of the arresting officer's failure to administer informed consent warnings to Chase prior to obtaining a blood sample. We vacate the suppression order.
I. BACKGROUND
The State alleges that on May 11, 2000, in Stockton Springs, the vehicle Keith Chase was driving went off the road and struck a tree. Officers from the Waldo County Sheriff's Office responded. Both Chase and his passenger were seriously injured in the accident and were transported to the hospital. The motion justice found that Chase was "both emotionally and intellectually disarranged," and that he "was not lucid and was only marginally capable of understanding events as they unfolded."
At the direction of one of the officers, a nurse at the hospital took a blood sample from Chase using a standard kit. Chase was not informed that his blood would be tested in an investigation of possible criminal charges against him, the officer did not attempt to inform Chase of the consequences of refusing the blood-alcohol test pursuant to 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2521(3) (Supp. 2000), and Chase never actually or impliedly consented to the test.
Chase was indicted by a grand jury for aggravated assault, Class B, see 17-A M.R.S.A. § 208(1)(A) (1983); aggravated operating under the influence, Class C, see 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2411(6) (Supp. 2000); and operating after habitual offender revocation, Class C, see 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2557(1) (Supp. 2000). He pleaded not guilty to all three charges and moved to suppress the results of the blood-alcohol test. Following a testimonial hearing, the court excluded the results of the test. The State appeals with the written approval of the Attorney General as is required by 15 M.R.S.A. § 2115-A(5) (Supp. 2000).
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Informed Consent Statute
The State contends that the court erred as a matter of law in excluding the results of Chase's blood-alcohol test on the basis of the officer's failure to give the informed consent warnings to Chase. The facts relevant to the motion are not disputed here. We review de novo the legal conclusions of the court on a motion to suppress. State v. Ullring, 1999 ME 183, 8, 741 A.2d 1065, 1067.
The Legislature has unequivocally established the duty of every driver to submit to a blood-alcohol test on probable cause to believe that he is operating a vehicle under the influence. 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2521(1) (1996). Serious consequences are imposed upon those drivers who refuse to submit to a test. See 29-A M.R.S.A. §§ 2411 (5)(A)(3)(b), 2521(3) (Supp. 2000). It is precisely because the consequences of a failure to cooperate can have such significant effects on the driver's life that the Legislature has required persons suspected of operating under the influence to be protected from unknowingly triggering those consequences.
Thus, the informed consent warnings are structured to inform the driver that he has a duty to take the test and that his failure to cooperate will result in serious sanctions. They are not intended to provide a driver with the choice of taking or refusing a blood-alcohol test. This conclusion is reflected in the legislation in two ways. First, consistent with its purpose of warning the driver of the consequences of his actions, the refusal sanctions may not be imposed against a defendant unless the defendant has fi
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