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Chase v. Neth5/27/2005
ed by a state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police so that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by the exclusion." 428 U.S. at 454. Applying this same general balancing test, the Court has similarly refused to expand the applicability of the exclusionary rule beyond criminal trials. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed. 2d 778 (1984) (exclusionary rule not applicable to civil deportation proceeding); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed. 2d 561 (1974) (exclusionary rule not applicable to federal grand jury proceeding). But see Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed. 2d 170 (1965) (exclusionary rule applied to civil forfeiture proceeding where forfeiture was penalty for criminal offense).
A majority of state courts considering the issue has held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is inapplicable to ALR proceedings. See, generally, Annot., 23 A.L.R.5th 108 (1994). In most instances, courts have applied the balancing test articulated in Janis. For example, in Tornabene v. Bonine ex rel. Highway Dept., 203 Ariz. 326, 54 P.3d 355 (Ariz. App. 2002), the court reasoned that because evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment would be inadmissible in a criminal proceeding, application of the rule in a civil license suspension proceeding would have only a marginal deterrent effect on police conduct. In addition, the court reasoned that applying the exclusionary rule in the administrative context would unnecessarily complicate the system and exclude otherwise reliable evidence that the motorist was driving while intoxicated. Addressing the lower court's finding that not applying the exclusionary rule to ALR proceedings "'would allow the State virtually the unlimited right to stop citizens and force them to take a breathaly er test for any reason or for no reason at all,'" the court stated:
First, law enforcement officers are only required to have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, not the higher standard of probable cause, before making an investigatory stop. . . . Second, the [applicable Arizona] statute plainly requires that law enforcement officers have "reasonable grounds to believe" that a motorist was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs before requesting that the motorist submit to testing. . . . Finally, we find it unlikely that law enforcement officers, lacking any reasonable suspicion of DUI, will assign scarce resources to randomly stop motorists on the chance that the officers will develop reasonable grounds to permit them to request the motorist to submit to testing.
(Citations omitted.) Tornabene v. Bonine ex rel. Highway Dept., 203 Ariz. at 336, 54 P.3d at 365. Other courts have similarly concluded that in a civil ALR contest, the marginal deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is outweighed by the substantial societal cost of losing reliable information used to remove intoxicated drivers from the highways. State v. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Powell v. Secretary of State, 614 A.2d 1303 (Me. 1992); Green v. Director of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 818 (Mo. App. 1988); Glass v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., Bur. of T. S., 460 Pa. 362, 333 A.2d 768 (1975). Other courts reaching the same result have noted that the ALR statutes at issue did not require the State to establish the validity of the arrest. Jacobs v. Director, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 149 N.H. 502, 823 A.2d 752 (2003); Beavers v. State, Dep't of Mtr. Vehicles, 109 Nev. 435, 851 P.2d 432 (1993).
There is also a minority
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