 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
In re Genevieve C.6/21/2005
nt officer who operates under the authority of the State of Nebraska or any political subdivision or court thereof, or other official, with the intent to instigate an investigation of an alleged criminal matter, or to impede an investigation of an actual criminal matter . . . .
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-744 (Reissue 1964). Notably, the Legislature later added the word "material" before the word "information." 1994 Neb. Laws, L.B. 907.
[10,11] A court has a duty to harmonize state and municipal legislation on the identical subject. Gillis v. City of Madison, 248 Neb. 873, 540 N.W.2d 114 (1995). "' he fact that a local ordinance does not expressly conflict with the statute will not save it when the legislative purpose in enacting the statute is frustrated by the ordinance.'" State ex rel. City of Alma v. Furnas Cty. Farms, 266 Neb. 558, 569, 667 N.W.2d 512, 522 (2003) (quoting 5 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 15.20 (3d ed. 1996)). Although the Legislature thought it was important to clarify that the false information be material, we cannot say that the failure of the ordinance to explicitly provide that the information be material frustrates the purpose of the statute.
The potential for the Lincoln ordinance to criminalize more false statements than the statute does not make it inconsistent under the case law discussed above. Like in Bodkin v. State, 132 Neb. 535, 272 N.W. 547 (1937), where the absence of an intent element did not render the ordinance inconsistent, the public policy of Lincoln and Nebraska in the instant case is the same and both provisions have a common purpose--seeking to dissuade the giving of false information to police officers regarding the subject of an investigation by making such conduct a crime. Further, the ordinance does not restrict anything expressly permitted by the statute. We conclude that the ordinance and the statute can coexist and are not contradictory and that the ordinance is therefore valid. Accordingly, the court did not err in overruling Genevieve's motion to dismiss.
Adjudication
The juvenile court found the allegations of the petition to be true beyond a reasonable doubt and adjudicated Genevieve as a child as defined by § 43-247(1), which definition is " ny juvenile who has committed an act other than a traffic offense which would constitute a misdemeanor or an infraction under the laws of this state, or violation of a city or village ordinance." The ordinance at issue made it unlawful for any person to make a false statement, known by such person to be false, to any police officer concerning the subject of an investigation. The facts show that Pratt, the police officer, was investigating the cashing of counterfeit payroll checks at a grocery store; that Genevieve occupied a vehicle matching the description of a vehicle observed earlier at another location in the same chain of stores; and that Genevieve lied to Pratt about her identity because she did not want to be taken into custody or to have any involvement in the crime being investigated. The State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the allegations in the petition were true.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the ordinance at issue was not inconsistent with the statute on false reporting and that the court did not err in adjudicating Genevieve as a child within the meaning of § 43-247(1). We therefore affirm the decision of the separate juvenile court adjudicating Genevieve as a juvenile as defined by § 43-247(1).
Affirmed.
|