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Commonwealth v. Brown4/29/2005
nce are unconstitutional (Argument V). We recognize that Appellant did not challenge his competency at trial or on direct appeal and first asserted the claim in his PCRA petition under the guise of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In the current appeal, Appellant presents the issue of whether he was "unconstitutionally tried while incompetent." Appellant's Brief at 2, Issue V. As this issue was not raised on direct appeal, we would generally find it waived. This Court has consistently held, however, that the issue of whether a defendant was competent to stand trial is an exception to the waiver rule in cases on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Tyson, 402 A.2d 995 (Pa. 1979); Commonwealth v. Silo, 364 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1976); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 318 A.2d 724 (Pa. 1974); See also Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966) (finding that it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently "waive" his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial).
The issue of whether this case law applies with equal force in the PCRA context has recently divided this Court. See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682 (Pa. 2004). In Santiago, a plurality of this Court held that the failure to raise on direct appeal a claim that the appellant was incompetent at the time of trial does not constitute a waiver of that claim for purposes of the PCRA. We reaffirm the plurality's position in Santiago in the instant appeal.
We begin our analysis with a review of the pertinent statutory language. As noted, Section 9544(b) provides that an issue is waived for purposes of the PCRA "if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, on appeal or in a prior state post-conviction proceeding." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). We recognize that Appellant "could have" raised the competency claim on direct review, but we conclude that the General Assembly intended for Section 9544(b) to apply to those claims that are required to be preserved. If the nature of the claim involves a right so fundamental to a fair trial that renders it non-waivable, then the claim is not required to be preserved and is not subject to the waiver provision of the PCRA. To hold to the contrary would render the language of the statute absurd and violate a fundamental rule of statutory construction. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922 (1); (stating that it is presumed that the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd.); See also Id. at § 1922 (3) (setting forth that it is presumed that the General Assembly does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or this Commonwealth).
Our Court has similarly ruled in three previous cases. In Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 410 A.2d 296, 298 n.8 (Pa. 1980), this Court held that the same reasoning for finding an issue of competency non-waivable on direct appeal would preclude a waiver of competency issues under the Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1580, § 1 1180-1 et seq. (Supp. 1979 -1980), the predecessor to the PCRA, when the defendant is shown to have been incompetent. Recognizing that the appellant's challenge to his guilty plea on grounds of incompetency was not raised on direct appeal, our Court nevertheless proceeded to examine the merits of the issue. We concluded that the PCHA court properly determined that the appellant possessed the mental capacity to enter a valid plea of guilt. Having failed to overcome the presumption that the appellant's failure to appeal was knowing and understanding, our Court affirmed the order of the PCHA court.
We elaborated on that proposition in Commonwealth v. Nelson, 414 A.2d 998 (Pa. 1980). There, the Court add
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