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Commonwealth v. Brown4/29/2005
t, 720 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1998), where this Court eliminated the capital case relaxed waiver rule on PCRA review. In order for the waiver rule to be "relaxed," the waiver doctrine must first be applicable to the issue at hand. As demonstrated supra, it is well-settled that the issue of whether a defendant was competent to stand trial is not subject to the waiver rule. Thus, our abolition of the capital case relaxed waiver rule has no bearing on this issue. This being the case, we now proceed to address the merits of Appellant's claim.
Appellant argues that he was incompetent to stand trial and therefore his conviction and death sentence are unconstitutional In support of this claim, he attached to his PCRA petition the declaration of Dr. Richard Dudley, Jr., wherein Dr. Dudley states that based upon his examination of Appellant in 1999, he has "significant questions as to [Appellant's] capacity to assist trial counsel." Declaration of Dr. Richard Dudley, Appendix of Exhibits to Initial Brief of Appellant, Exhibit 14.
A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial. Commonwealth v. duPont, 681 A.2d 1328, 1330-31 (Pa. 1996). Thus, the burden is on Appellant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was incompetent to stand trial. In order to prove that he was incompetent, Appellant must establish that he was either unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to participate in his own defense. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 555 A.2d 1264, 1270 (Pa. 1989); see also 50 P.S. § 7402(a). Appellant has failed to satisfy this standard.
The report of Dr. Dudley discloses that his examination of Appellant took place eight years after Appellant's trial. While Dr. Dudley states that he has "significant questions" regarding Appellant's capacity to assist trial counsel, he has not stated that Appellant was incompetent in 1991 when the trial occurred. Moreover, when evaluated by the court psychologist on December 10, 1991, Appellant was found "capable of understanding a sentencing procedure." The doctor also found that Appellant "does not suffer from a major illness." Trial counsel, who worked with the defendant from the time of his arrest until after his trial, saw no reason to raise the issue of defendant's competency and, instead, argued that he acted in self-defense. The PCRA court, therefore, properly concluded that the defendant was able to consult with counsel rationally and possessed a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings.
Appellant next argues that the proportionality review performed by this Court on direct appeal denied him due process (Argument IX). This Court has consistently recognized that issues regarding the proportionality of capital sentences were decided by our Court on direct appeal and are therefore previously litigated and beyond the purview of the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 851 A.2d 883, 900 (Pa. 2004); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d at 708; Commonwealth v. Wharton, 811 A.2d 978, 991 (Pa. 2002). Appellant, however, is not challenging the proportionality of his sentence, but rather the method of review our Court employed on direct appeal. As the PCRA petition was the first opportunity for Appellant to raise such a claim, we shall entertain the merits of the issue. See Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 851 A.2d at 900.
At the time of Appellant's trial, this Court was required to determine whether his death sentence was "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3)(iii). Appellant contends that our Court's proportionality review utilized an inaccurate database without providing Appellant's counsel notice and an opportunity to participate. This identical
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