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Commonwealth v. Brown4/29/2005
courts must ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a); In re Canvass of Absentee Ballots of November 4, 2003 General Election, 843 A.2d 1223, 1230 (Pa. 2004); Hannaberry HVAC v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Snyder, Jr.), 834 A.2d 524, 531 (Pa. 2003). The plain language of a statute is generally the best indication of legislative intent. Commonwealth v. Gilmour Manufacturing Co., 822 A.2d 676, 679 (Pa. 2003). Thus, the Statutory Construction Act mandates that, " hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b); see also Canvass of Absentee Ballots, 843 A.2d at 1230 (citing Scheipe v. Orlando, 739 A.2d 475, 478 (Pa. 1999)); Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan v. English, 664 A.2d 84, 87 (Pa. 1995) ("Where the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity the legislative intent is to be gleaned from those very words."). Courts may resort to other considerations to divine legislative intent only when the words of the statute are not explicit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Thus, this Court has consistently held that the rules of statutory construction are to be utilized only where the statute at issue is ambiguous. Canvass of Absentee Ballots, 843 A.2d at 1230 (citing O'Rourke v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Corrections, 778 A.2d 1194, 1201 (Pa. 2001)); see also Ramich v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Bd. (Schatz Electric, Inc.), 770 A.2d 318, 322 (Pa. 2001); English, 664 A.2d at 87.
The PCRA's waiver provision is drafted in plain and unambiguous terms: "an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, ... on appeal or in a prior state post-conviction proceeding." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). This Court has construed the waiver provision according to its plain terms. E.g., Commonwealth v. Bond, 819 A.2d 33, 39 (Pa. 2002) (issues are waived under PCRA if appellant could have presented them on direct appeal but failed to do so); Commonwealth v. Bracey, 795 A.2d 935, 940 (Pa. 2001) (same). The statute contains no "relaxed waiver" exception. Here, the Majority actually recognizes that the always-counseled appellant unquestionably "could have raised" a mental competency claim at trial or on direct appeal. Indeed, because such a claim would have been shielded from ordinary judicial waiver principles on direct review by a judicial "relaxed waiver" rule governing direct appeal review of competency claims, see Commonwealth v. Tyson, 402 A.2d 995 (Pa. 1979); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 318 A.2d 724 (Pa. 1974), appellant and his lawyers had a uniquely broad opportunity to raise a competency claim. Because appellant did not do so, under the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, any claim sounding in competency is waived and is therefore unavailable on collateral attack.
The Majority nevertheless concludes that the waiver provision cannot be applied according to what the provision plainly says, because the General Assembly had a different, but unexpressed, intention with respect to some defaulted claims. In its invocation of principles of statutory construction to defeat the plain meaning of the statute the Majority fails to identify any ambiguity in the statute. Since the polestar of ambiguity is lacking, there is no room for the Majority's statutory construction. Absent constitutional infirmity -- and none has been argued by appellant or by the Majority on his behalf -- the plain language of the statute controls.
To achieve its preferred non-waiver result, the Majority in effect rewrites the post conviction relief statute. The Majority states that the statute must be r
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