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Commonwealth v. Brown4/29/2005
Court specifically invoked the distinct "knowing and understanding" language of the PCHA. Moreover, the Fernandez Court ultimately concluded that the competency claim was waived. The relevant analysis and holding reads as follows:
Fernandez's contention here, that his plea was invalid due to his mental incapacity, is an issue that could have been raised on direct appeal and would, thus, be waived unless he rebuts the presumption that his failure to file a direct appeal was knowing and understanding or proves that extraordinary circumstances existed excusing his failure to file a direct appeal. Yet, proof that a defendant lacked the mental capacity to "knowingly and intelligently" enter a plea of guilty would be sufficient to rebut the presumption of a "knowing and understanding" failure to appeal where the incapacity shown is non-transitory. Mental incapacity, sufficient to prevent the entering of a valid guilty plea, would also prevent a "knowing and understanding" failure to appeal.
In the present case, the PCHA court concluded Fernandez did possess the mental capacity to enter a valid plea of guilt. Our examination of the record persuades us that this conclusion is warranted by the evidence. Fernandez has, therefore, failed to overcome the presumption that his failure to appeal was knowing and understanding. Thus, his claim was waived. 410 A.2d at 298 (footnotes omitted).
The Majority's reliance upon the Nelson case is misplaced for distinct and multiple reasons peculiar to it. First, despite the fact that Nelson involved a similar issue and was decided a mere two months after the unanimous decision in Fernandez, neither the Nelson plurality opinion nor the responsive opinions ever cited to Fernandez; it is as if there were two different jurisdictions at work. Second, despite the Majority's argument to the contrary, the notion that Nelson is a precedential decision is plainly erroneous. A "majority opinion" is " he opinion of an appellate court in which the majority of its members join." Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990), at 955 (emphasis added). In contrast, a "plurality" opinion is " n opinion of an appellate court in which more justices join than in any concurring opinion (though not a majority of the court) . ." Id. at 1154. The key to precedential status in an appellate opinion is the tally of "joining" votes. Agreement with, or concurrence in a mandate, is not a "joinder," much less is it a joinder in the crucial ratio decidendi of the case. Indeed, even a joinder in a "disposition" is just a more polite way of saying, "I join in the result only" -- it is not a joinder for purposes of establishing precedent.
In Nelson, only three of the six participating Justices joined in the plurality opinion; the other three were in a dissenting posture. The Majority nevertheless argues that Nelson is precedential "for the rule of law at issue here" -- i.e., apparently, a rule that this Court has the power to dictate to the General Assembly that defaulted mental competency claims are beyond its power to deem waived on collateral attack -- by relying upon the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts as the crucial fourth vote. Slip op. at 24 n.12. But, Justice Roberts' dissent did not join in any part of the Nelson plurality opinion, nor was it even a concurring and dissenting opinion, which might indicate joinder in the disposition, if not the rationale. All that Justice Roberts indicated was his "agreement" to remand the record for further proceedings on the competency-based claim, without explaining what further proceedings he contemplated. Justice Roberts never signed on to the rationale of the lead opinion and we cannot pretend that he did. Plurality opinions, by def
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