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State v. Bennett6/27/2005
398-399, 458 S.E.2d 56, 58 (Ct. App. 1995). Bennett stipulated to jurisdiction in circuit court; however, the State refused to accept the stipulation. In State v. James, our supreme court held that "the State cannot be forced to accept a defendant's stipulation to prior convictions because that would interfere with the State's right to prove its case with 'evidence of its own choosing.'" 355 S.C. 25, 34, 583 S.E.2d 745, 749 (2003) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 327 S.C. 440, 445, 486 S.E.2d 512, 514 (1997)).
Bennett asserts the State was required to accept his offer to stipulate under Section 56-5-2980 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2004), which provides that " f the defendant stipulates that the charge constitutes a second or subsequent offense, the indictment shall not contain allegations of prior offenses and evidence of such prior offenses must not be introduced." However, section 56-5-2980 does not apply to the crimes of DUS or habitual offender. Section 56-5-2980 states that it only applies to trials and proceedings "in which the defendant is charged with a violation of Section 56-5-2920 [reckless driving], 56-5-2930 [operating a vehicle under the influence], or 56-5-2933 [driving with an unlawful alcohol concentration]." See Anderson, 318 S.C. at 399 n.2, 458 S.E.2d at 58 n.2 ("The plain meaning of the statute [§ 56-5-2980], which has no application to a charge of DUS, suggests that the solicitor must assent before a stipulation is effective."). Since the State refused to accept the stipulation and was not required to by the statute, the State had to prove that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction of the DUS charge. Anderson, 318 S.C. at 398-399, 458 S.E.2d at 58.
Therefore, " bsent a stipulation as to subject matter jurisdiction, [Bennett] had no real right to object to the admission into evidence of his prior DUS . . . conviction ." Id. at 399, 458 S.E.2d at 58. Further, the trial judge instructed the jury that Bennett's prior record was "introduced solely for the purpose of showing jurisdiction in [trial] court." Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a certified copy of Bennett's driving record and letters from the Department stating that Bennett was under suspension for DUS and for being a habitual offender. Additionally, Bennett was not prejudiced by the admission into evidence of prior convictions because the trial court gave a sufficient limiting instruction to the jury.
The Department has the authority to declare a person a habitual offender by following the procedures outlined in section 56-1-1030 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2004). Pursuant to this statute, the Department had adjudicated Bennett to be a habitual offender. To prove that Bennett was driving after having been declared a habitual offender, the State was required to show that Bennett had been found to be a habitual offender and was operating a motor vehicle while the decision of the Department prohibiting operation was in effect. S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1100 (Supp. 2004).
Bennett argues that the judge should not have allowed the State to introduce his whole driving record into evidence; however, the trial judge had already properly admitted his prior convictions for DUS to establish jurisdiction of the court. Although Bennett's prior record of driving under the influence and violation of the implied consent law may have been inadmissible, we find that the evidence was not unduly prejudicial to Bennett based on the entire record in the case and the judge's limiting instruction to the jury. Additionally, we hold the admission of the evidence was harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence against Bennett. See State v. McLeod, 362 S.C. 73, 82, 606
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