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State v. Collins6/29/2005
he State may argue to the jury on the DUI charge that Collins knew he would lose his license.
In our view, the purpose and structure of section 55-10-406 indicate that the legislature intended only that a driver be advised that his license will be suspended if he refuses an alcohol or drug test, not that a driver be advised of the specific length of the suspension. As we have previously observed, we must construe section 55-10-406 together with all of the driving under the influence statutes. Turner, 913 S.W.2d at 160. The purpose of these statutes is "to remove from the highway, prosecute, and punish those who engage in the dangerous menace of driving under the influence." Id.; see also State v. Lawrence, 849 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tenn. 1993) (driving under the influence statutes are "`intended to enable the drunken driver to be apprehended before he strikes'") (quoting Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Okla. 1975)).
Thus, the purpose of the implied consent statute is not to allow motorists suspected of driving under the influence to make an "informed choice" about whether to take an alcohol or drug test; rather, it is to advance the State's objective of keeping intoxicated drivers off the roadways. In furtherance of this objective, " he legislature intended to enable the State to establish the offense by scientific evidence. For the privilege of operating a vehicle on our highways, the driver consents to a test to determine whether that privilege is, as a law enforcement officer suspects, being abused." Turner, 913 S.W.2d at 160. We note also that section 55-10-406(a)(3) specifically provides that revocation of a driver's license under the circumstances applicable to Collins does not constitute a criminal offense, as it confers only an administrative penalty. Turner, 913 S.W.2d at 163. Therefore, the rule that we strictly construe the statute against the State does not apply. Id.
Viewing the statute in this light, we conclude that section 55-10- 406(a)(2) required only that Collins be informed that his license would be suspended if he refused to take the breath test. Section 55-10- 406(a)(2) does not mandate that the specific length of the suspension, which varies according to the driver's prior history, be spelled out for the driver. Rather, section 55-10-406(a)(2) sets general parameters, requiring that a driver be informed that refusal to be tested will result in a license suspension and could result in a mandatory fine and mandatory jail or workhouse sentence. As the Court of Criminal Appeals noted, the 2000 amendments did not alter the language requiring that the driver be advised that refusal to take the test will result in suspension. The amendments also did not change the provision barring suspension of the license when the consequences of refusal are not stated.
The particular consequences of refusal are spelled out separately in section 55-10-406(a)(3). That section specifies the length of the suspension as well as the maximum fine and the minimum jail or workhouse sentence. Had the legislature intended these consequences to be spelled out to each driver who is requested to take an alcohol or drug test, the legislature would have included the specific consequences in section (a)(2) of the statute. The legislature did state with specificity in section (a)(2) the prior convictions which subject a driver to a mandatory fine and jail or workhouse sentence; this bolsters our conclusion that the legislature did not intend to require arresting officers to enumerate the entire range of consequences of refusal to take an alcohol or drug test in the advisory stated to drivers. Because the specific consequences are spelled out in a separate section, we conclude that a gen
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