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State v. Boyd5/17/2005
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406(3) is referred to as the implied consent law because all persons who are granted the privilege of operating a motor vehicle are deemed to have consented to take a test for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content of their blood when they are suspected of driving under the influence . A condition precedent for such a test is that the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving while under the influence of an intoxicant or drug. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406(a)(3), the implied consent law, provides in pertinent part:
If such person having been placed under arrest and thereafter having been requested by a law enforcement officer to submit to such test and advised of the consequences for refusing to do so, refuses to submit, the test shall not be given, and such person shall be charged with violating this subsection. The determination as to whether a driver violated the provisions of this subsection shall be made at the same time and by the same court as the one disposing of the offense for which such driver was placed under arrest. If the court finds that the driver violated the provisions of this subsection, except as otherwise provided in this subdivision, the driver shall not be considered as having committed a criminal offense; however, the court shall revoke the license of such driver for a period of . . . .
The trial judge found that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Boyd was driving while under the influence of an intoxicant or drug, that he refused to take the test and, therefore, that Mr. Boyd violated the implied consent law. As a consequence, the trial court imposed a one-year suspension of his driver's license.
Mr. Boyd contends that Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406(3) is unconstitutional because it requires the judge in a criminal proceeding to also serve as an administrative officer of the Tennessee Department of Safety and rule on the civil charge of the alleged violation of the implied consent law. We find the issue to be without merit because it has already been resolved by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Goats v. State, 364 S.W.2d 889 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1963). That court held that the implied consent law did not violate the separation of powers clause. The court specifically noted that the legislature could lawfully authorize courts to determine whether a person had violated conditions that were imposed at the time the driver's license was granted and to suspend or revoke that privilege as a penalty. The court said, in pertinent part:
Conviction under this Code Section with the right of the trial judge to prohibit the person from driving is a judicial act and it has no relation whatever to the preceding sections governing the Department of Safety's power to grant, revoke and suspend licenses. Section 59-1035, T.C.A., also goes into penalties for second and third offenses, etc., and embodies in it Chapter 100 of the Acts of 1955, which expressly says that a conviction under the section now being talked about shall in no way affect the powers of the Safety Department suspension and revocation under the other sections.
Goats, 364 S.W.2d at 891. We agree and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Following oral argument, the State of Tennessee filed a motion requesting that the matter be rescheduled for another hearing. The basis for the motion was understandable. The Clerk inadvertently failed to notify the State's counsel of the setting of the oral argument. Nevertheless, since we have rendered a decision favorable to the State of Tennessee, there is no prejudice to the State and therefore no need to conduct an
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