State v. Davis4/1/2005
2, 2003, and entered final judgment on December 11, 2003. The judgment form reflects a guilty plea to DUI and a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with 362 days to be served on unsupervised probation and two days pretrial jail credit. In addition, the defendant's driver's license was revoked for one year, and she was ordered to complete DUI school and pay a $250 fine and costs. The reckless driving count was dismissed. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Relying on the trial court's conclusion that the 1992 capias, which had resulted in the defendant's 2002 arrest, had expired five years after its issuance and become void, she argues, pursuant to the holding in State v. Wilson, 6 S.W.3d 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998), that the December 11, 2003, sentence and judgment were invalid. Additionally, she argues that the lapse of time between her 1992 court appearance and her 2003 sentencing violated her right to a speedy trial.
I. Validity of the Capias
We will review first the argument that the capias issued in 1992, but not served on the defendant until 2002, was void because Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-206 provides that certain court papers have only a five-year lifespan:
Any process, warrant, precept or summons authorized to be issued by any of the judges or clerks of the court, in any criminal prosecution on behalf of the state, may be issued at any time and made returnable to any day of the term. In a misdemeanor case, if such a process, warrant, precept or summons has not been served, returned or quashed within five (5) years from the date of its issuance, such process, warrant, precept or summons shall be automatically terminated and removed from the records.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-206 (2003). By the defendant's view, this statute caused the 1992 capias to become void in 1997, and, thus, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose sentence on December 11, 2003.
Since this claim presents a question of law, our review is de novo, with no presumption of correctness given to the trial court's judgment. Warren v. American Holding Co., 20 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Tenn. 1999). Our role is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent, id.; Schering-Plough Healthcare Products, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 999 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tenn. 1999), which is to be ascertained from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used. Id. Further, we construe this statute, to whatever extent possible, so that its component parts are consistent and reasonable, State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 30 (Tenn. 1996), and in the light of reason, Voss v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 958 S.W.2d 342, 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
The parties disagree as to the application of the sole previous judicial interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-206. In that case, State v. Walter Thomas Allen, No. 02C01-9503-CR-00087, 1995 WL 764996, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 1995), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Mar. 25, 1996), the defendant had pled guilty on October 6, 1983, to DUI, second offense, and was sentenced to the county workhouse. However, upon his request, "execution of the sentence was deferred until November 14, 1983." Id. The defendant then "fled the jurisdiction and forfeited his bond." On November 18, 1983, a capias was issued for him, but he was not arrested until 1994, over ten years later. He appeared in court on October 19, 1994, "arguing that he should not be required to serve his sentence because he was arrested on a void warrant." Id. In light of the intended purpose of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-206, we concluded that the 1983 capias still was valid at the time of the 1994 arrest:
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