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Webb v. State5/3/2005
are addressable under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. See State v. Prince, 781 S.W.2d 846, 853 (Tenn. 1989).
The petitioner relies, in part, upon the requirements for the taking of guilty pleas imposed by Mackey and Rule 11, Tenn. R. Crim. P., to argue that his guilty plea was not voluntary, knowing or intelligent. He contends the trial court failed to require an adequate factual basis for his guilty plea, inquire whether his willingness to plead guilty resulted from prior discussions with the prosecutor, and advise him that he was under oath at the plea hearing and that his statements could be used against him in later prosecutions for perjury. However, these inquiries are not linked to any of the specified constitutional rights in Boykin and are not cognizable in a suit for post-conviction relief. See State v. Neal, 810 S.W.2d 131, 137 (Tenn. 1991); Prince, 781 S.W.2d at 846. Post-conviction relief is available only when a conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of a violation of a constitutional right. T.C.A. § 40-30-105.
The record reflects that the trial court satisfied the requirements of Boykin. During the colloquy between the petitioner and the trial court at the plea hearing, the trial court asked the petitioner if the plea was freely and voluntarily made and if he had been informed of the elements of the crime, burden of proof, and defenses. It also asked him if he understood the nature of the charges against him and if he was aware that by pleading guilty he was giving up the right to a trial by jury, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to self-incrimination.
As for the petitioner's argument that his mental incompetence on the day of the plea hearing due to alcohol abuse rendered his guilty plea void and that his attorney pressured him to plead guilty, the record is devoid of any proof to support these claims. The petitioner's attorney testified that once the petitioner "dried out," he was capable of cogent and clear thinking, and Mr. Carter testified that the petitioner was calm and well-dressed when they met in April. The trial court accredited the testimony of the attorney over that of the petitioner and found that the petitioner entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, having cleared his mind of the debilitating effects of alcohol during his incarceration of 163 days prior to the plea hearing. The record does not preponderate against the trial court's findings, nor does it reflect that the petitioner was pressured in any way by his attorney to plead guilty in order to avoid developing a trial strategy.
We conclude that the petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Based on the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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