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McBride v. State3/9/2005
hat he advised appellant to proceed to a lighted or public area if he were to come into contact with an officer of the Lake Village Police Department. Sheriff White received a call on the night of October 21, informing him that a Lake Village Police Officer was attempting to make contact with appellant.
Following this testimony and two other witnesses whose testimony did not relate to the stop, appellant's counsel renewed the motion for directed verdict, and the motion was again denied. Appellant was convicted of the offense of fleeing and fined one dollar. This appeal followed. Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-54-125(a) (Repl. 1997) defines fleeing as: "If a person knows that his immediate arrest or detention is being attempted by a duly authorized law enforcement officer, it is the lawful duty of such person to refrain from fleeing, either on foot or by means of any vehicle or conveyance."
On appeal, appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Instead, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. His argument is based on Rule 3.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure (2004), which states in part that:
A law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place may, in the performance of his duties, stop and detain any person who he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit (1) a felony, or (2) a misdemeanor involving danger of forcible injury to persons or of appropriation of or damage to property, if such action is reasonably necessary either to obtain or verify the identification of the person or to determine the lawfulness of his conduct.
In general, a motion for directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Aydelotte v. State, 85 Ark. App. 67, 146 S.W.3d 392 (2004) (citing Cherry v. State, 80 Ark. App. 222, 95 S.W.3d 5 (2003)). Appellant's reliance on Rule 3.1 in the context of a directed- verdict motion is misplaced. In Berry v. State, 74 Ark. App. 141, 143, 45 S.W.3d 435, 437 (2001), appellant requested that this court find that "the detention of the appellant by Officer King amounted to an illegal arrest or, in the alternative, that Act 1077 as applied to the appellant violated the ex post facto law." This court held that, "even assuming that appellant is correct in that he was illegally arrested, an invalid arrest may call for the suppression of a confession or other evidence, but it does not discharge a defendant from the responsibility of the offense." Id. (citing Urquhart v. State, 30 Ark. App. 63, 782 S.W.2d 591 (1990) (citing Clark v. State, 26 Ark. App. 268, 764 S.W.2d 458 (1989)); see also Lamb v. State, 21 Ark. App. 111, 730 S.W.2d 252 (1987) (affirming defendant's conviction of driving while intoxicated where an officer had the authority to issue a citation even though outside her jurisdiction).
In this case, appellant never sought the suppression of evidence due to a violation of Rule 3.1. In fact, no evidence obtained from the stop was introduced by the State, other than appellant's identity. Officer Hayes did testify that it was not until appellant finally stopped his vehicle in his son's driveway that he became aware of appellant's identity; however, appellant failed to object to the introduction of this testimony. Other than appellant's identity, the State's evidence consisted solely of the officer's observations prior to the stop. Because appellant did not seek suppression of the State's evidence, object to the introduction of the evidence, or challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for directed verdict. Accordingly, appellan
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