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Valdez v. Superior Court of the County of Riverside1/7/2005
Petitioner contends that, having already pleaded guilty to unlawful driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851), the People were thereafter precluded by the multiple-prosecution prohibition of Penal Code section 654 from prosecuting him for carjacking this very same vehicle. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss the prosecution for carjacking and we summarily denied his petition for writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted a petition for review and transferred the matter to this court with directions to issue an alternative writ on the question of whether the current prosecution for carjacking is barred under Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822 (Kellett) and section 654. We have done so, and we again conclude that petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested and deny the petition.
FACTS
In actions filed in October 2003 (RIF-112851) and January 2004 (SWF-006496), petitioner was charged with two separate instances of unlawful driving or taking a vehicle (§ 10851) and receiving stolen property.
On February 6, 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty in both actions and in the October action (RIF-112851), the charges were reduced to a misdemeanor and petitioner was sentenced to misdemeanor probation including 74 days in county jail. In the other case (SWF-006496), petitioner was sentenced to felony probation with a custody term of 240 days in county jail.
On February 11, 2004, petitioner was arraigned on a new felony complaint for carjacking (RIF-115036) which occurred on December 30, 2003.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the carjacking prosecution on the grounds of vindictive prosecution, double jeopardy, and the rule in Kellett. The vehicle that petitioner is alleged to have carjacked on December 30, 2003, was the same vehicle that he pleaded guilty to having unlawfully driven on January 6, 2004.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the cases involved factually separate and distinct acts. It also concluded that there was no basis to find vindictive prosecution.
DISCUSSION
Section 654, subdivision (a) prohibits both multiple punishment and multiple prosecution, providing in pertinent part: "An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other." The prohibition against multiple punishment is designed to ensure that a defendant's punishment is commensurate with his criminal liability whereas the proscription against multiple prosecution is a procedural safeguard against needless harassment and the waste of public funds. (Kellett, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 827.)
Kellett is the leading case on the application of the statute's bar of multiple prosecutions under section 654. In Kellett, the defendant was standing on a sidewalk holding a pistol. He was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, exhibiting a firearm in a threatening manner. The Supreme Court held that this conviction prohibited a later prosecution for possessing a concealable weapon by a felon arising out of the same facts. It stated that: "When, as here, the prosecution is or should be aware of more than one offense in which the same act or course of conduct plays a significant part, all such offenses must be prosecuted in a single proceeding unless joinder is prohibited or severance permitted for good cause. Failure to unite all such offenses will result in a bar
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