 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Valdez v. Superior Court of the County of Riverside1/7/2005
istinguished both Flint and People v. Wasley (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 121. "In Wasley, the court held that the defendant, an ex-convict, could not be separately prosecuted for armed robbery and possession of a weapon used in that robbery. And in Flint, it was held that a defendant who was arrested for drunk driving while driving a stolen car could not, after his guilty plea to drunk driving, be subjected to a subsequent prosecution for grand theft of an automobile and joy-riding. In Wasley and Flint, the focus of both prosecutions was on a single incident: the armed robbery in Wasley, the drunk driving in Flint. To prosecute the defendant in Wasley again for his connection with the very weapon used in the robbery would have involved, to borrow a phrase from the opinion in Flint at page 338 of 51 Cal.App.3d, `a recycling of much of the same evidence' used by the People to support the earlier prosecution. The same can be said of Flint, where `the same incident which furnished the evidence that defendant was driving in an intoxicated condition, also supplied proof that what he was driving was an automobile he had stolen.' (Id. at p. 338.)" (Martin, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at pp. 977-978.)
Applying Flint's evidentiary standard here, we note that the evidence supporting the section 10851 offense was simply that on January 6, 2004, petitioner was found next to the driver's seat of the stolen vehicle, tossing personal items out of the truck. A female companion told police officers that she and petitioner had been driving the truck all day and were off-roading. Petitioner stated that he and the female had been walking in the area and came upon the abandoned truck. The evidence that petitioner was driving or using the truck on January 6, 2004, would not furnish proof that petitioner was the person who stole the truck on December 30, 2003-and it certainly would not have shown that he had carjacked it. As discussed above, the section 10851 offense of January 6 was independent of the carjacking of December 30 and required separate proof.
Because of this conclusion that section 654 does not bar the carjacking action, we need not address whether an exception to the Kellett rule applies because the prosecutor was reasonably unaware of the two cases.
Petitioner contends that the prosecution of the carjacking case is vindictive, asserting that the charge was filed because the prosecutor was dissatisfied with the disposition on February 6, 2004, in the section 10851 case. The prosecution, however, asserted that law enforcement was still investigating the carjacking incident and the prosecutor was not actually aware of the existence of the multiple cases. Given the record before us, we cannot make a finding of vindictive prosecution and decline to hold that there should be a presumption of vindictiveness, as petitioner urges.
DISPOSITION
The alternative writ is discharged, and the petition for writ of prohibition is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
We concur:
RICHLI, J.
KING, J.
Page 1 2 3 California DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|