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People v. Beaudoin1/4/2005
les, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455), but ask us to critique the court's reasoning. We refuse the request.
Defendants also argue the instruction violated their rights to due process. Our Supreme Court has rejected this argument as well so long as the evidence provides a rational basis to infer a consciousness of guilt. (People v. Griffin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011, 1027.) Here, the evidence so provides.
Upon his arrest, Beaudoin told detectives he had not been using drugs and had not had any sex with Debra. However, Beaudoin testified at trial he had smoked methamphetamine and taken Ecstasy pills that day. He also testified he fondled Debra's body while with her in Jennifer's apartment and he allowed her to orally copulate him while at Markes' apartment.
Hurst told detectives, among other things, he spent only 10 minutes in Jennifer's apartment that night and had not seen Debra kissing Beaudoin. At trial, however, Hurst testified to being in Jennifer's apartment long enough to have small talk and drinks with Debra, engage in consensual sexual activities other than intercourse, and then watch television for another hour and 35 minutes. Beaudoin then joined the pair, and Hurst saw Beaudoin and Debra engage in sexual activities.
The evidence justified the trial court's giving CALJIC No. 2.03 to the juries.
II. CALJIC No. 2.90
Defendants assert the trial court denied them due process when it instructed the jury on reasonable doubt with CALJIC No. 2.90. We unequivocally reject this argument -- again. (People v. Hearon (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1286.)
Defendants also claim the instruction denied them equal protection of the law. They allege it failed to provide an adequate or uniform standard by which jurors would determine whether guilt had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. An almost identical contention, that the instruction "`gave the jury no guidance as to the level of certainty,'" was held to be frivolous in People v. Hearon, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pages 1286, 1287.
Defendants claim a result contrary to Hearon is now required by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore (2000) 531 U.S. 98, 105-106 [148 L.Ed.2d 388, 399] (Bush). We disagree.
In Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1 [127 L.Ed.2d 583] (Victor), the high court held: "The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so . . . ." (Id. at p. 5.)
None of the opinions in Bush purports to reject Victor, supra, 511 U.S. 1 or hold that trial courts must define reasonable doubt. It is fundamental that a case is not authority for an issue neither raised nor considered. (People v. Wells (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 984, fn. 4.)
Rather, in Bush, the court majority carefully distinguished the election contest before it from the ordinary case in which a jury evaluates evidence at a criminal trial. In the election contest, " he factfinder confronts a thing, not a person. The search for intent can be confined by specific rules designed to ensure uniform treatment." (Bush, supra, 531 U.S. at p. 106.) Here, in contrast, the factfinder confronted numerous persons who appeared as live witnesses and had to decide "whether to believe [each] witness." (Ibid.) Defendants do not argue that the assessment of credibility can be confined by a series of specific rules, as in Bush. Nor does Bush suggest that the next step in the process, the determination whether the facts found by the trier of fact establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, is "susceptible to much further refin
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