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People v. Beaudoin1/4/2005
convicted of felony spousal abuse, and that conviction was used here to impose a one-year enhancement. Hurst had prior convictions of battery, driving on a suspended license, driving under the influence, possession of drug paraphernalia, and one felony drug conviction.
As we have noted, the rule of Apprendi and Blakely does not apply to a prior conviction used to increase the penalty for a crime. Since one valid factor in aggravation is sufficient to expose defendant to the upper term (People v. Cruz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 427, 433), the trial court's consideration of other factors, in addition to the prior convictions, in deciding whether to impose the upper term did not violate the rule of Apprendi and Blakely.
Relying on Apprendi and Blakely, defendants also claim the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences because the court relied upon facts not submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, thus depriving them of the constitutional right to a jury trial on facts legally essential to the sentence. Defendants' claims of error fail because the rule of Apprendi and Blakely does not apply to our state's consecutive sentencing scheme.
Penal Code section 669 imposes an affirmative duty on a sentencing court to determine whether the terms of imprisonment for multiple offenses are to be served concurrently or consecutively. (In re Calhoun (1976) 17 Cal.3d 75, 80-81.) However, that section leaves this decision to the court's discretion. (People v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 234, 255-256.) "While there is a statutory presumption in favor of the middle term as the sentence for an offense [citation], there is no comparable statutory presumption in favor of concurrent rather than consecutive sentences for multiple offenses except where consecutive sentencing is statutorily required. The trial court is required to determine whether a sentence shall be consecutive or concurrent but is not required to presume in favor of concurrent sentencing." (People v. Reeder (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 900, 923.)
Penal Code section 669 provides that upon the sentencing court's failure to determine whether multiple sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively, then the terms shall run concurrently. This provision reflects the Legislature's policy of "speedy dispatch and certainty" of criminal judgments and the sensible notion that a defendant should not be required to serve a sentence that has not been imposed by a court. (See In re Calhoun, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 82.) This provision does not relieve a sentencing court of the affirmative duty to determine whether sentences for multiple crimes should be served concurrently or consecutively. (Ibid.) And it does not create a presumption or other entitlement to concurrent sentencing. Under Penal Code section 669, a defendant convicted of multiple offenses is entitled to the exercise of the sentencing court's discretion, but is not entitled to a particular result.
The sentencing court is required to state reasons for its sentencing choices, including a decision to impose consecutive sentences. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.406(b)(5); People v. Walker (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 619, 622.) This requirement ensures that the sentencing judge analyzes the problem and recognizes the grounds for the decision, assists meaningful appellate review, and enhances public confidence in the system by showing sentencing decisions are careful, reasoned, and equitable. (People v. Martin (1986) 42 Cal.3d 437, 449-450.) But the requirement that reasons for a sentence choice be stated does not create a presumption or entitlement to a particular result. (See In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921, 937.)
Therefore, entrusting to trial
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