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Strenke v. Hogner3/18/2005
and that the manufacturer knew this was practically certain to occur, the drug manufacturer could simply use the plain language of § 895.85(3)--language Wischer concluded was unambiguous--to preclude liability, arguing that it did not intend or know there was a practical certainty that those particular plaintiffs who are seeking to recover punitive damages would be harmed. Also, consider where a person fires a gun into a crowd of people and injures a stranger. How could the person have awareness that it is practically certain he or she would cause injury to someone he or she never knew?
Id. (Emphasis in original.)
. We share the court of appeals' concern with the Boomsma interpretation and reject it here. Laws must be interpreted, considering the legal and practical consequences, to avoid unreasonable and absurd results. State v. Jennings, 2003 WI 10, , 259 Wis. 2d 523, 657 N.W.2d 393. It is doubtful the legislature intended to afford greater protection to a defendant who intentionally disregarded the rights of a great many unspecified individuals than a defendant who intentionally disregarded the rights of one particular individual. Our conclusion is supported by both the common law and legislative history.
. Under the common law's "disregard of rights" standard, the "disregard" was "of the plaintiff's rights." Sharp, 227 Wis. 2d at 21. Despite this fact, punitive damages were available in products liability cases where no showing was made that the manufacturer's conduct was specifically directed at the particular plaintiff. E.g., Sharp, 227 Wis. 2d 1; Walter v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 121 Wis. 2d 221, 358 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1984); Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 293 N.W.2d 897 (1980). Instead, it was enough to show "by clear and convincing evidence that the harm suffered was the result of the manufacturer's reckless disregard for the safety of product users, consumers or others who might be harmed by the product." Sharp, 227 Wis. 2d at 21.
. The silence of the legislative history on this matter is also significant. If the legislature had truly intended such a sea change in the law, we would expect to find something in the history of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) to indicate that. Yet, at oral argument, counsel for Hogner acknowledged that she could not point to anything in the drafting records to support her position. Our examination of the legislative history yields the same result.
. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we determine that a defendant's conduct giving rise to punitive damages need not be directed at the specific plaintiff seeking punitive damages in order to recover under the statute.
V.
. Having answered the first two questions of the certification, we turn finally to the third question: if there was sufficient evidence to submit a punitive damages question to the jury, is the jury's punitive damage award excessive and therefore in violation of Hogner's due process rights? We begin by considering the sufficiency of the evidence.
. Under the common law standard, drunk driving was the type of conduct that could support an award of punitive damages in an appropriate case. Lievrouw, 157 Wis. 2d at 347. In Lievrouw, the court of appeals observed that, " runk driving is a terrible scourge," and " ntentionally driving while alcohol-impaired is the type of outrageous conduct that punitive damages should punish and can deter." Id. at 345-46.
. Although the standard of conduct for punitive damages has been heightened with Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3), we are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence that Hogner was aware that his conduct was substantially certai
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