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Frazer v. State12/23/2002
ly, it threatens the safety of the public, and that threat must be eliminated as quickly as possible. . . . The `totality' of circumstances tips the balance in favor of public safety and lessens the . . . requirements of reliability and corroboration." Frette, 331 Ark. at 120-21, 959 S.W.2d at 743 (citations omitted).
The facts of the case at bar fit within the reasoning set forth in Frette and Bohanan. Here, there was an identified informant, Larry Paul Davis, who personally observed appellant and his actions, and the information Davis gave to the Springdale Police Department as to the type of vehicle appellant was driving and the direction in which it was headed was able to be independently corroborated by Officer Chatfield. Therefore, under a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the trial judge's denial of appellant's motion to suppress was not clearly erroneous or against the preponderance of the evidence.
Concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop appellant based solely upon the tip received from Davis, we must next determine if the stop, which was made by Officer Chatfield outside of his territorial jurisdiction of Springdale, falls within any of the exceptions to the rule that an officer cannot arrest outside his territorial jurisdiction. Officers may arrest outside their territorial jurisdiction in four instances: (1) when the officer is in fresh pursuit; (2) when the officer has a warrant for arrest; (3) when a local law enforcement agency has a written policy regulating officers acting outside its territorial jurisdiction and when said officer is requested to come into the foreign jurisdiction; (4) when a sheriff in a contiguous county requests an officer to come into his county to investigate and make arrests for violations of drug laws. Thomas v. State, 65 Ark. App. 134, 985 S.W.2d 752 (1999) (citing Henderson v. State, 329 Ark. 526, 953 S.W.2d 26 (1997)).
The only exception possibly applicable in the present case is the first instance, when an officer is in fresh pursuit, and we hold that the officer was in fresh pursuit of appellant at the time the stop was made. Our decision in King v. State, 42 Ark. App. 97, 854 S.W.2d 362 (1993), supports this determination. Although the facts leading up to the stop in King were based upon the officer's personal observations of appellant's erratic driving, this court held that because the officer had the authority to stop, or to stop and arrest, the appellant before he left the jurisdiction, he remained within his bounds of authority when he followed the appellant outside his jurisdiction and then made the stop and arrest.
Likewise, we arrive at the same conclusion in the present case. In Frette, supra, our supreme court, in discussing State v. Evans, 692 So.2d 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), held, "Although the investigating officer did not have all of this information given by the caller to the dispatcher, it was imputed from the dispatcher to the officer." Frette, 331 Ark. at 114, 959 S.W.2d at 739. In the present case, based upon the information contained in the informant's tip, all of which was imputed to Officer Chatfield, he had the authority to stop appellant when he first encountered him within the city limits of Springdale, and that authority extended outside of his territorial jurisdiction when he followed appellant out of Springdale and made the stop in neighboring Fayetteville.
Affirmed.
Neal and Baker, JJ., agree.
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