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Lucero v. Kennard4/1/2004
51.
**18 I now turn to the scope of review provided by a "trial de novo." In Pledger v. Cox, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[t]he words 'de novo' ... have at least two possible interpretations when applied to judicial review ...: '(1) A complete retrial upon new evidence; and (2) a trial upon the record made before the lower tribunal.' " 626 P.2d 415, 416 (Utah 1981) (quoting Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 98 Utah 431, 436, 100 P.2d 552 (1940)). Though "[t]he meaning of 'trial de novo' in each statute is obviously dictated by the wording and context of the statute in which it appears," id., a trial de novo that is conducted following a defendant's justice court conviction follows the first definition--that of a "complete retrial upon new evidence." Id. This comports with the definition offered by Black's Law Dictionary, wherein "trial de novo" is defined as "[a] new trial on the entire case--that is, on both questions of fact and issues of law." Black's Law Dictionary 1512 (7th ed. deluxe 1999). Thus, "[b]ecause a justice of the peace court in this state is not a court of record, an appeal from that court is by way of a trial de novo in the district court, rather than a review of the justice's rulings." Wisden v. District Ct., 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1984).
**19 Because it acts "as if there had been no trial in the first instance," Black's Law Dictionary 1512 (7th ed. deluxe 1999), a district court conducting a trial de novo "is not confined to the record before the justice court and need not defer to the justice court's findings and determinations. The district court neither reverses nor affirms the judgment of the justice court, but renders a new, distinct, and independent judgment." State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 276 (Utah Ct.App.1998). When a district court conducts a trial de novo review of a justice court conviction, "the case [stands] precisely as it would have at that stage of the proceedings if it had begun in that court in the first instance." Id.; accord Dean v. Henriod, 1999 UT App 50, 9 n. 1, 975 P.2d 946. [FN2]
FN2. Given this construct, Utah courts have insisted that though a district court exercises its "appellate jurisdiction" when conducting a trial de novo, State v. Hudecek, 965 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah Ct.App.1998), the trials de novo that are held before the district courts must not be characterized in the same manner as a standard appeal which is held before the court of appeals or supreme court. In State v. Hinson, this court clearly drew this distinction, therein declaring that certain rules governing a case filed "[i]n a conventional appeal environment
... [have] no place in an appeal from a justice court judgment." 966 P.2d 273, 275-76 (Utah Ct.App.1998). Similarly, we emphasized in Dean v. Henriod that there is a distinction between a "traditional appeal" and "an appeal from justice court." 1999 UT App 50, 9 n. 1, 975 P.2d 946. Thus, when a district court conducts a trial de novo, the district court is "not acting in a typical appellate capacity." Hinson, 966 P.2d at 276. In a related context, the Utah Supreme Court has declared that, because a district court has the authority to make findings of fact in its trial de novo review of Industrial Commission decisions, the district court should be viewed "as an independent fact finder and not as an intermediate appellate court." University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n, 736 P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1987) (emphasis omitted).
**20 When confronted with possible statutory conflicts that might preclude a defendant from seeking post-conviction relief, "any ambiguity that may exist ... should be resolved in favor of a criminal defendant." Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah 1990). Against this backdrop, I think that the majority's de
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