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People v. Jenkinson10/15/2002
THE COURT
Appellant, David Leon Jenkinson, pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol with three prior specified convictions (Veh. Code, §§ 23152/23550). On July 25, 2001, the court sentenced Jenkinson to a two-year term. On appeal, Jenkinson contends the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to suppress. We will affirm.
FACTS
On March 20, 2000, Bakersfield Police Officer Frank Pascua arrested Jenkinson after stopping him for speeding and determining he was driving under the influence .
On June 6, 2001, Jenkinson filed a motion to suppress.
On June 20, 2001, at a hearing on this motion, Officer Pascua testified that on the day in question, he was conducting radar enforcement in the 3800 block of Chester Avenue in Bakersfield. This area is a business district where the posted speed limit is 40 miles per hour (mph). At 6:00 p.m., Pascua saw Jenkinson in a Chevy Camaro travelling at a speed he visually estimated at approximately 50 mph. Pascua then used a handheld radar unit and clocked the Camaro at 55 mph.
Pascua followed the Camaro and initiated a traffic stop. After contacting Jenkinson and noticing signs of intoxication, Pascua instructed him to get out of the car so he could perform field sobriety tests. Jenkinson subsequently admitted his license was suspended and that he had an outstanding arrest warrant for driving under the influence . Pascua arrested Jenkinson on these matters as well as on a new charge of driving under the influence.
The prosecution also introduced an engineering and traffic survey for the portion of roadway where Jenkinson was observed speeding.
During cross-examination, Pascua testified that it was sunny and dry when he stopped Jenkinson and that because of light vehicle and pedestrian traffic at that hour, Jenkinson's speed did not pose a danger to anyone.
After hearing counsels' arguments, the court denied the motion.
DISCUSSION
Introduction
Jenkinson contends that except for his speed exceeding the prima facie speed limit, Officer Pascua did not have another reason to believe his speed was potentially dangerous to someone and, thus, unlawful. He further contends that because Pascua was unaware of the engineering and traffic survey done for the section of the highway at issue, it should have appeared to Pascua that he was involved in enforcing an illegal speed trap and it was objectively unreasonable for Pascua to stop Jenkinson. Finally, Jenkinson contends that the prima facie speed on the portion of highway where he was stopped is not supported by a proper engineering and traffic survey. Thus, according to Jenkinson, the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. We will reject these contentions.
"The standard of appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.]" (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) Officer Pascua Had A Reasonable Suspicion That Jenkinson Was Violating The Basic Speed Law
" police officer can legally stop a motorist only if the facts and circumstances known to the officer support at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law. [Citations.]" (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926, original emphasis.)
Section 22350 sets forth the basic speed la
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