 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Marshall11/14/2003
could later be used to enhance a subsequent DUI offense to a third degree felony. The United States Supreme Court responded to a similar argument in Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994). In Nichols, the defendant argued that "at a minimum, due process requires a misdemeanor defendant to be warned that his conviction might be used for enhancement purposes should the defendant later be convicted of another crime." Id. at 748, 114 S.Ct. at 1928. The Court disagreed, stating:
No such requirement was suggested in Scott [v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979)], and we believe with good reason. In the first place, a large number of misdemeanor convictions take place in police or justice courts which are not courts of record. Without a drastic change in the procedures of these courts, there would be no way to memorialize any such warning. Nor is it at all clear exactly how expansive the warning would have to be; would a Georgia court *782 have to warn the defendant about permutations and commutations of recidivist statutes in 49 other States, as well as the criminal history provision of the Sentencing Guidelines applicable in federal courts? And a warning at the completely general level--that if he is brought back into court on another criminal charge, a defendant such as Nichols will be treated more harshly--would merely tell him what he must surely already know. [FN8]
FN8. Many other courts have echoed the Supreme Court's statements in Nichols, rejecting the notion that a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to specific notice that the instant conviction may later be used for enhancement purposes should the defendant be convicted of a subsequent crime. See State v. Chapman, 685 A.2d 423, 425 (Me.1996) (rejecting defendant's argument that her prior DUI convictions could not be considered for purposes of enhancement and holding
that "[d]efendant's due process claim fails [because a]fter the effective date of the amendment [to the DUI law], defendant had fair notice that a conviction for operating under the influence would subject her to the currently defined penalty"); State v. Zoellner, 920 S.W.2d 132, 135-36 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (rejecting defendant's due process argument that he " 'had no reason to believe nor did he know that by entering pleas to two [prior DUI charges], that he was "two-thirds of the way" to a felony offense' " and stating that "a trial court is not required to inform a defendant who pleads guilty that the legislature may amend the law in the future"); State v. Arguello, 655 N.W.2d 451, 452-53 (S.D.2002) (per curiam) (rejecting defendant's due process argument that "because he was not informed that [his two prior DUI] convictions could subsequently be used to enhance his [current DUI] sentence they are void for enhancement purposes" and stating that "[a] 'defendant is not entitled, as a constitutional right, ... to information regarding the future use of his conviction for purposes of enhancement' ") (quoting Presley v. State, 498 So.2d 832, 833 (Miss.1986)); State v. Edwards, 302 S.C. 492, 397 S.E.2d 88, 89-90 (1990) (rejecting defendant's due process argument and stating: "The inquiry is not whether appellant had notice of the 1988 amendment at the time of his 1983 conviction, but whether he had fair notice of the amendment when he committed the current offense on February 3, 1989.
Because the current offense took place after the effective date of the amendment, appellant clearly had notice that his 1983 conviction would be considered in determining his punishment for the current offense. Therefore, appellant's due process rights have not been violated.").
Id. Defendant cites rule 9-301 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administra
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Utah DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|