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People v. Martinez10/31/2002
em (§ 204).
Appellant's analysis is inapt, as his crime of attempted murder was punished by the mitigated term of five years' imprisonment. The 20-year sentence was imposed because the method utilized by appellant has been determined by the Legislature to pose a serious danger to the citizens of California. Admittedly, these offenses, in the abstract, are more serious because actual death or serious bodily injury occurs when those crimes are committed. However, the crimes of voluntary manslaughter, gross vehicular manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter involve a significant distinction from appellant's case - the absence of malice. (§§ 191.5, 193.) Arson is a general intent crime, and there is no requirement that defendant intended to cause great bodily injury. (CALJIC No. 14.80.) Similarly, mayhem is only a general intent crime, there is no requirement the defendant have the specific intent to cause the injury. (People v. Villegas (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1226.) Here appellant's 20-year sentence was imposed, not for the crime of attempted murder, but for his chosen means of committing the offense - the personal and intentional discharge of a firearm.
"... More significantly, the Legislature determined in enacting section 12022.53 that the use of firearms in commission of the designated felonies is such a danger that, `substantially longer prison sentences must be imposed ... in order to protect our citizens and to deter violent crime.' The ease with which a victim of one of the enumerated felonies could be killed or injured if a firearm is involved clearly supports a legislative distinction treating firearm offenses more harshly than the same crimes committed by other means, in order to deter the use of firearms and save lives. (Note (1998) 29 McGeorge L.Rev. 531, 533-534; People v. Aguilar (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 478, 486; People v. Morgan (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 444, 449.) That is this law's purpose. (Stats. 1997, ch. 503, § 1; Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 4 (Apr. 8, 1997) p. 2, quoting author [`With the 10-20-life provisions of AB 4, we are sending another clear message: If you use a gun to commit a crime, you're going to jail, and you're staying there.'].)" (Martinez, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 497-498.)
The constitutionality of the punishment imposed pursuant to section 12022.53 has been upheld in numerous reported cases. (People v. Taylor (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 318, 323-324 [cruel and unusual claim]; People v. Villegas, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1231 [cruel and unusual claim]; People v. Alvarez (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118-1119 [equal protection claim]; People v. Gonzales (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1, 12-20 [cruel and unusual, equal protection, and due process claims]; People v. Zepeda (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1212-1216 [cruel and unusual claim]; Martinez, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 493-498 [cruel and unusual claim].)
We need not consider the third Lynch technique because appellant has not proffered any argument that section 12022.53 is unconstitutional on that basis. Moreover, although appellant contends that his 20-year term is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, he advances no argument or authority in support of this contention. In view of this, we need not discuss this contention any further. (People v. Ham (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 768, 783, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Compton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 55, 60, fn. 3.) Nevertheless, we find that the following quote from Martinez is equally applicable here:
"The judicial inquiry commences with great deference to the Legislature. Fixing the penalty for crimes is the province of the Legislature, which is in the best positi
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