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State v. Munson12/31/2001
t a forced construction to either limit or expand their meaning. State v. Thomas, 635 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tenn. 1982). Courts must construe statutes as a whole and in conjunction with their surrounding parts and their interpretation should be consistent with their legislative purposes. State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1995). The meaning of a statute is to be determined not from specific words in a single sentence or section but from the act in its entirety in light of the general purpose of the legislation; any interpretation should express the intent and purpose of the legislation. National Gas Distrib., Inc. v. State, 804 S.W.2d 66, 67 (Tenn. 1991); Loftin v. Langsdon, 813 S.W.2d 475, 478-79 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-403(a) is unambiguous. It is reasonable to infer that the legislature, when enacting this particular statute, was aware of the margin of error inherent in properly administered breathalyzer examinations. It is our conclusion that a .20% breathalyzer result, from a properly administered test, regardless of any margin of error, would be probative of the issue of blood alcohol content and admissible for sentencing purposes. In State v. Sensing, our supreme court concluded that "the purpose of all the testing is to provide objective scientific data to eliminate guesswork and speculation and to supplement the fallible observations of humans." 843 S.W.2d at 417. Because facts relevant to sentencing are required to be proved by only a preponderance of the evidence, and because the breathalyzer result suggests a probability of a blood alcohol content at or above the required minimum, the test results the state intends to offer as proof should not be excluded from consideration.
Accordingly, the order excluding the introduction of the evidence for enhanced sentencing purposes is vacated and the cause is remanded for trial. Costs are assessed against the defendant, for which execution may issue if necessary.
Joe G. Riley, J., concurring.
I concur with the result reached by the majority and consider this case distinguishable from Scisney. In Scisney, Judge Tipton and I, in separate opinions, concluded an intoximeter reading of .04%, by itself, was insufficient to establish "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the blood alcohol concentration was, in fact, .04%. See State v. Mark T. Scisney, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9605-CC-00209, 1997 WL 634515, at *9-11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 16, 1997, at Nashville). This was because there was a 25% chance that the actual level was below .04% due to the margin of error. Id.
In the case at bar, the blood alcohol level is not an element of the offense requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt as was the case in Scisney. Here, it is only necessary to establish this sentencing enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence.
Although I do not necessarily agree that the legislature was aware of the margin of error in breathalyzer results, I do believe a trial judge could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that a .20% test result from a properly administered test satisfies this enhancement provision.
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
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